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his EAP begins 30 years of pub-
lication and includes “items of 
interest” and “citations re-
ceived.” We offer an “in memo-
riam” for geographer David Lowenthal, 
an early figure in environmental phenome-
nology, who died in London in September 
at the age of 95. We feature two “book 
notes”: first, architect and architectural 
theorist Hendrik Auret’s Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Interpretation of Heideg-
ger’s Philosophy; and, second, philosopher 
Edward Casey’s The World on Edge. 
This issue of EAP includes four essays, 
the first of which is the second part of a 
1999 conference presentation on Goethean 
science by the late philosopher Henri 
Bortoft. Second, anthropologist Jenny 
Quillien reflects upon her recent experi-
ences of living in Amsterdam to consider 
the primary role of language in contrib-
uting to places and lifeworlds. 
Third, speedskater David Feric draws 
on his firsthand experience of the sport to 
point toward a speedskating phenomenol-
ogy. Last, artist and art educator Doris 
Rohr considers the 
work of British artist 
and art critic John 
Ruskin as a concep-
tual and methodo-
logical means to fa-
cilitate a style of 
seeing and drawing 
that maintains sym-
pathetic contact with 
the thing looked at 
and represented. 
 
Left: John Ruskin’s 
1872 Moss and Wild 
Strawberry (graphite 
and traces of body-
color on grey-blue pa-
per, 541 x 376 mm., 
Ashmolean Museum, 
Oxford, UK). In de-
scribing his drawing 
aims, Ruskin spoke of 
“a delicate method of 
work, such as may en-
sure [the artist’s] see-
ing truly. For I am 
nearly convinced that, 
when once we see 
keenly enough, there is 
very little difficulty in 
drawing what we see.” 
Refer to Doris Rohr’s 
essay, p. 21; she dis-
cusses Ruskin’s Moss 
on p. 23 and p. 28. 
Conferences 2019 
The 12th-annual “Giving Voice to Expe-
rience” conference takes place at Seattle 
University, March 8–9, 2018. The focus 
is how phenomenological and other 
modes of qualitative research have value 
for therapeutic practice. https://www.seat-
tleu.edu/artsci/map/professional-development/giv-
ing-voice-to-experience/. 
 
The Society for Phenomenology and 
Media (SPM) holds its 21st international 
conference, March 13–15, 2019, hosted 
by the Universidad de Antioquia, Medel-
lín, Colombia. The conference theme is 
“What we say about media and what that 
says about us: Medium, its message and 
geopolitics.” http://societyphen-
media.wix.com/socphenmedia#!info. 
 
The Interdisciplinary Coalition of 
North American Phenomenologists 
(ICNAP) holds its annual conference 
June 3–5, 2019 at George Washington 
University in Washington, DC. USA. 
The conference theme is “social phenom-
enology,” though papers on other phe-
nomenological topics are welcome. 
ICNAP is an organization of scholars and 
practitioners committed to fostering in-
terdisciplinary connections in phenome-
nology. http://icnap.org/. 
 
The annual International Human Sci-
ences Research Conference takes place 
June 24–28, 2019 at Molde University in 
Molde, Norway. The formal conference 
theme is “Joy, suffering, and death,” 
though papers and panels can relate to 
other topics as well. For the 2018 HSRC 
newsletter, go to: https://www.seattleu.edu/me-
dia/college-of-arts-and-sciences/graduate-de-
grees/masterofartsinpsychology/professionaldevel-
opment/conferences-events-documents/ISHR-
Newsletter_Revised.pdf. Conference info: 
https://www.himolde.no/english/research/events-
articles-and-news/events/conferencesand-semi-
nars/2019/ihsrc2019/. 
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Items of interest 
The Architectural Humanities Research 
Association (AHRA) is a non-profit aca-
demic organization that provides a net-
work for researchers in architectural hu-
manities across the United Kingdom and 
overseas. AHRA promotes, supports, de-
velops, and disseminates high-quality re-
search in the areas of architectural history, 
theory, culture, design and urbanism. One 
can become a member of AHRA by fol-
lowing the link to the AHRA website and 
hit the registration tab. AHRA currently 
has some 1,900 worldwide members; 
membership is free and open to all re-
searchers working in schools of architec-
ture and related disciplines. http://www.ahra-
architecture.org/. 
 
Phenomenology of Time and Space is the 
theme of the 18th annual conference of the 
Polish Phenomenological Association, to 
be held December 7–8, 2018, in Warsaw. 
The conference aim is to “rethink the fun-
damental phenomenological categories of 
time and space in their ontological, episte-
mological, and existential manifestations. 
We aim to review their contemporary rele-
vance in various research fields inspired 
and affected by phenomenology (e.g., phe-
nomenological psychology, anthropology, 
and cognitive science).” phenomenolo-
gytimespace@gmail.com. 
 
The 11th symposium of the Architecture, 
Culture, and Spirituality Forum 
(ACSF) takes place May 16–19, 2019, at 
Taliesin West in Scottsdale, Arizona. The 
main theme is “Continuity in Architecture, 
Culture, and Spirituality,” though organiz-
ers will consider other topics of interest. 
www.acsforum.org/symposium2019/. 
 
The 56th annual International Making 
Cities Livable conference takes place in 
Portland, Oregon, June 17–21, 2019. The 
conference theme is “A Healthy City for 
All.” http://www.livablecities.org/. 
 
The 58th annual meeting of the Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy (SPEP) will be hosted by Pittsburgh’s 
Duquesne University, October 31–Novem-
ber 2, 2019. Papers and panels from di-
verse philosophical perspectives in all ar-
eas of continental philosophy are welcome. 
Meeting conjointly with SPEP are two 
other groups supporting phenomenological 
research: The Society for Phenomenology 
and the Human Sciences (SPHS) and the 
International Association of Environ-
mental Philosophy (IAEP). IAEP’s an-
nual meeting will be November 2–4, 2019. 
www.spep.org; www.sphs.info/; www.environmen-
talphilosophy.org/. 
 
Upstate New York’s Nature Institute is 
sponsoring a two-week residential inten-
sive, June 24–July 6, 2019. Drawing on 
Goethean science, the thematic focus is 
“Encountering Nature and the Nature of 
Things.” www.natureinstitute.org. 
 
Citations received 
Anna Ulrikke Andersen, 2018. 
Translation in the Architec-
tural Phenomenology of 
Christian Norberg-Schulz. Ar-
chitectural Research Quar-
terly, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 81–90. 
 
This architectural theorist examines a 1979 
note written by architectural phenomenol-
ogist Christian Norberg-Schulz entitled 
“Translation.” She examines what role 
translation played in his theory of genius 
loci. She points out that, as discussed in 
this note, translation refers to “a tool for 
gathering, in the Heideggerian sense, 
which gives birth to an architecture in 
which the architectural outcome is not in-
ferior to its precursor but simply different 
and from which something constructive 
might emerge. Seen in relation to architec-
ture as language, translation can be under-
stood as the crux of Norberg-Schulz’s 
longstanding interest in the meaning of ar-
chitecture and place and how design must 
negotiate continuity and change.” 
 
David Appelbaum, 2017. 
Notes on Water: An Aqueous 
Phenomenology. Rhinebeck, 
NY: Monkfish Books. 
 
This philosopher and former editor of Pa-
rabola writes a poetic hermeneutics of wa-
ter, focusing particularly on its etheric 
qualities and multivalent expression as 
lived symbol. Headings in a chapter enti-
tled “Noah” include “flood,” “storm,” 
“mist,” “drought,” and “the olive branch.” 
Headings in a chapter entitled “Ptah” in-
clude “foam,” “stream,” “mist,” “clouds,” 
and “storm.” In some ways, the book is 
reminiscent of Gaston Bachelard’s mode 
of poetic phenomenology. 
 
Kevin Baker, 2018. The Death 
of a Once Great City. Har-
per’s, July, pp. 24–47. 
 
This journalist provides a sobering account 
of “the fall of New York and the urban cri-
sis of affluence.” Having lived in New 
York for more than 40 years, Baker has 
“seen all the periods of boom and bust…, 
almost all of them related to the ‘paper 
economy’ of finance and real estate specu-
lation that took over the city long before it 
did the rest of the nation.” 
He emphasizes, however, that these ear-
lier “ups and downs” are blips compared to 
the current devolution that he describes as 
“the systematic, wholesale transformation 
of New York into a reserve of the ob-
scenely wealthy and the barely here—a 
place increasingly devoid of the idiosyn-
crasy, the complexity, the opportunity, and 
the roiling excitement that make a city 
great.” See sidebar, next page. 
 
Michael Broadway, Robert 
Legg, and John Broadway, 
2018. Coffeehouses and the 
Art of Social Engagement: An 
Analysis of Portland Coffee-
houses. Geographical Re-
view, vol. 108, no. 3 (July), 
pp. 433–456. 
 
These geographers consider the historic 
function of coffeehouses to promote “so-
cial engagement as so-called third places 
among independently owned coffeehouses 
in the city of Portland, Oregon. Twenty-
three individual coffeehouses were evalu-
ated to determine the extent to which they 
provide a supportive physical environment 
for social engagement…. [D]etailed patron 
behavior was recorded over a three-week 
period.” 
The researchers determined that “few 
coffeehouses provided a supportive physi-
cal environment. The majority of coffee-
house patrons during the weekday and 
weekend ordered drinks ‘to go’. Among 
those who stayed during the weekday most 
sat alone and worked. Coffeehouses are 
spaces to ‘be alone together’. It was only 
on lunchtime weekends that coffeehouses 
were full of the sound of conversations. 
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Further study should consider the effect of 
eliminating free Wi Fi and banning laptops 
on social engagement and whether other 
place attributes need to be incorporated to 
promote social engagement.” 
 
A few cupcake shops 
here and there 
As New York enters the third decade 
of the twenty-first century, it is in im-
minent danger of becoming something 
it has never been before: unremarkable. 
It is approaching a state where it is no 
longer a significant cultural entity but 
the world’s largest gated community, 
with a few cupcake shops here and 
there. For the first time in its history, 
New York is, well, boring. 
     This is not some new phenomenon 
but a cancer that is metastasizing on 
the city for decades now. And what’s 
happening to New York now—what’s 
already happened to most of Manhat-
tan, its core—is happening in every af-
fluent American city. San Francisco is 
overrun by tech conjurers who are rap-
idly annihilating its remarkable diver-
sity…. Boston, which used to be a city 
of a thousand nooks and crannies, 
back-alley restaurants and shops, dive 
bars and ice cream parlors hidden un-
der its elevated, is now one long, mo-
notonous wall of modern skyscrapers. 
In Washington, an army of cranes has 
transformed the city in recent years, 
smoothing out all that was real and or-
ganic into a town of mausoleums…. 
     By trying to improve our cities, we 
have only succeeded in making them 
empty simulacra of what was. To bring 
this about we have signed on to politi-
cal scams and mindless development 
schemes that are so exclusive they are 
more destructive than all they were 
supposed to improve. 
     The urban crisis of affluence exem-
plifies our wider crisis: we now live in 
an America where we believe that we 
no longer have any ability to control 
the systems we live under (Kevin 
Baker, p. 25). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christie Johnson Coffin and 
Jenny Young, 2017. Making 
Places for People: 12 Ques-
tions Every Designer Should 
Ask. NY: Routledge. 
 
In this pocket-sized book, two architects 
present “twelve social questions in envi-
ronmental design”: (1) What is the story of 
this place? (2) Whose place is it? (3) 
Where is this place? (4) How big is this 
place? (5) What logic orders this place? (6) 
Does this place balance community and 
privacy? (7)  What makes this place use-
ful? (8) Does this place support health? (9) 
What makes this place sustainable? (10) 
Who likes this place? (11) What evidence 
is there this place will work? (12) Does this 
place foster social equity? 
The book is written in a clear, accessible 
style; includes a good number of illustra-
tions (all black and white); refers to key 
figures in the history of environment-be-
havior research; and delimits a reasonable 
and useful way to envision programming 
and designing.  
 
Robert Freestone and Edgar 
Liu, eds., 2017. Place and 
Placelessness Revisited. 
London: Routledge. 
 
The 16 chapters of this edited volume, 
mostly by urban designers and planners, 
consider the continuing intellectual influ-
ences of geographer Edward Relph’s 
Place and Placelessness, originally pub-
lished in 1976 and reprinted in 2008. “For 
four decades, ideas put forward by this 
seminal text have continued to spark de-
bates, from the concept of placelessness it-
self, through how it plays out in our socie-
ties, to how city designers might respond 
to its challenge in practice.” Entries in-
clude Relph’s “The Paradox of Place and 
the Evolution of Placelessness,” as well as 
Lucy Montague’s “Theory’s Role in 
Placelessness”; John Tomaney’s “In-
sideness in an Age of Mobilities”; Hazel 
Easthope’s “Losing Control at Home?” 
Rachel Cogger’s “Tuning In and Out of 
Place”; Nancy Marshall’s “Urban 
Squares: A Place for Social Life”; and Kim 
Dovey’s “Place as Multiplicity.” The side-
bar, right, reproduces a portion of Relph’s 
“Afterword.” 
 
The contradictions and 
confusions of place 
Interpretations of place, placelessness, 
place-making, and insideness now 
stretch far beyond the ones I suggested 
four decades ago. Most of these inter-
pretations have been, or can be, con-
tested theoretically, while actual 
places—the ones we live or work in or 
travel to visit—are filled with contra-
dictions and the confusions attendant 
on increased connectivity and mobility, 
unprecedented ethnic juxtapositions, 
the manipulation of identities to attract 
investment, and numerous other 
changes and strategies. 
     A particular place may offer a se-
cure sense of belonging, or be exclu-
sionary, or be both at once; a placeless 
landscape can be seen as an expression 
of the geography of anywhere that re-
flects a view from nowhere, or as an 
expression of efficiency and standardi-
zation that makes travel convenient; 
worldwide mobility can be compatible 
with, rather than a threat to, insideness; 
place-making can be responsive to lo-
cal meanings or manipulated for corpo-
rate ends. 
     What I gather from the remarkable 
range of discussions in this book is that 
places are particular, familiar, mean-
ingful fragments of the world, yet little 
about them can be taken for granted. 
There are no obvious restrictions to the 
scale or character of places, and their 
particularity is everywhere now perme-
ated by processes and products that 
originate elsewhere or nowhere in par-
ticular. A place at any scale is a world 
fragment that is a specific focus of 
meanings and activities, yet is both 
open to the world and an opening to 
the world. 
     This openness was not obvious 
when lives were mostly rooted and 
place-making was mostly a local activ-
ity. In this context, I suggested in 
Place and Placelessness that meaning-
ful places have to be made through the 
efforts and experiences of those who 
live and work in them. 
     This conclusion needs to be revised 
to correspond to contemporary global 
mobility and displacement that result 
either from choice, as in the global 
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north, or are forced by war and depri-
vation, as in parts of the global south. 
     The challenge is to bring thinking, 
politics, and place-making practices 
into line with new realities of disem-
bedding and re-embedding (Edward 
Relph, 2017, pp. 270–71). 
 
Kathleen T. Galvin, ed., 2018. 
Routledge Handbook of Well-
Being. London: Routledge. 
 
This edited collection of 30 chapters “ex-
plores diverse conceptualizations of well-
being, providing an overview of key issues 
and drawing attention to current debates 
and critiques.” The chapters are organized 
around three central questions: What is 
well-being? How do different disciplines 
and professions understand well-being? 
How is well-being manifest in human life? 
Several of the chapters emphasize a phe-
nomenological approach. 
Contributions include “Cities, well-be-
ing, world—a Heideggerian analysis” 
(Robert Mugerauer); “Well-being and 
being-well: a Merleau-Ponty perspective 
on psychosomatic health” (Jennifer 
Bullington); “Dwelling-mobility: An exis-
tential theory of well-being” (Les Todres 
and Kathleen T. Galvin); “Well-being 
and phenomenology: Lifeworld, natural at-
titude, homeworld and place” (David Sea-
mon); “Heritage and well-being: Thera-
peutic places, past and pesent” (Timothy 
Darvill, Vanessa Heaslip, and Kerry 
Barrass); “Ecological health and caring” 
(Helena Dahlberg and Albertine Ran-
heim); “Embodied routes to well-being: 
horses and young people” (Ann Heming-
way); and “Creativity and asesthetic think-
ing: Toward an aesthetics of well-being” 
(Dorthe Jørgensen). 
 
Thomas F. Gieryn, 2018. 
Truth-Spots: How Places 
Make People Believe. Chi-
cago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 
 
Known for his earlier writings on place, 
this sociologist considers “how places lend 
credibility and legitimacy to beliefs and 
claims.” His real-world foci include the sa-
cred site of Delphi, Thoreau’s pondside 
cabin, Linnaeus’ botanical garden, outdoor 
historical museums, pilgrimage environ-
ments, research libraries, and American 
courthouses. 
Gieryn writes: “The premise of this book 
is that place matters mightily for what peo-
ple believe to be true. We can better under-
stand why some assertions or propositions 
or ideas become for some people credible 
and believable by locating them some-
where on the skin of the earth—and by ask-
ing what things are to be experienced at 
that spot and how this place is culturally 
understood.” 
The sidebar, below, includes a portion of 
Gieryn’s discussion of American court-
house architecture—specifically, the 
courthouse design of St. Louis’s Eagleton 
US Courthouse, completed in 2000 and 
part of the largest federal building program 
since the New Deal “for the renovation and 
construction of new courthouses,” an effort 
carefully detailed in the 1991 U.S. Courts 
Design Guide, which requires that all new 
federal courthouses “must be planned and 
designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate 
the encounter between the citizen and the 
justice system.” 
 
Public, restricted, and 
secure circulations 
The interior design of Eagleton follows 
stringent rules set down in the Design 
Guide for segregating discrete catego-
ries of people as they move to and 
from the courtrooms—in the interest of 
a fair and impartial trial. Federal court-
yards have three separate circulation 
systems leading to the courtroom, and 
they must never intersect (except at 
spots well insulated by security doors, 
locks, cameras, guards, and signage). 
     Arranging passages on a courtroom 
floor at Eagleton was something like 
designing an electrical circuit where 
the wires must never cross—lest the 
system of justice short out. The Design 
Guide spells this out: “(1) public circu-
lation and access for spectators, news 
media representatives, attorneys, liti-
gants, and witnesses; (2) restricted cir-
culation and access for judges, law 
clerks, courtroom deputy clerks, court 
reporters/recorders, and jurors; and (3) 
secure circulation and access for pris-
oners and U.S. Marshal Services per-
sonnel.” The three discrete circulation 
systems are not optional but impera-
tive: “Any uncontrolled intersection of 
differing circulation patterns consti-
tutes a breach of security and must be 
avoided.” 
     The same principle of absolute seg-
regation applies to the functionally 
specific spaces that surround every 
courtroom at Eagleton…. At [St. 
Louis’] Old Courthouse, four tiny 
niches just off the corners of the court-
room sufficed as support space; now, 
auxiliary activities require more square 
footage per floor than the courtroom it-
self. Architects spend a lot of time 
plotting out “adjacencies”—deciding 
which activities (and rooms for those 
activities) need to be next to each 
other, and which must be kept apart 
(Thomas F. Gieryn, 2018, pp. 113–14). 
 
Tonino Griffero and Giam-
piero Moretti, eds. Atmos-
phere/Atmospheres. Milan: 
Mimesis International. 
 
This philosopher and comparative-litera-
ture scholar define atmosphere as “a senso-
rial and affective quality widespread in 
space.” Their edited collection’s nine 
chapters examine the topic via a wide 
range of themes. Chapter titles include: 
“Atmospheres of and in Geography” (L. 
D’Allessandro, R. Sommella, and L. 
Viganoni); “Technosocial Atmospheres: 
Migration, Institutional Racism, and Twit-
ter” (A. Del Guercio, M. Anna Di Palma, 
and T. Terranova); “Economic Atmos-
pheres” (A. di Maio and S. Ercolano); 
“Something More: Atmospheres and 
Pathic Aesthetics” (T. Griffero); “Some 
Notes on Atmospheres and Financial Mar-
kets” (A. Lopes and L. Gaeta); and “North 
American Atmosphere (Canada, Alaska, 
Greenland): Ecumene and Nordicity in 
Canada, Climate Change and Geostrate-
gies in the Far and Extreme North” (R. G. 
Maury). This book is the third in the Mi-
mesis series, “Atmospheric Spaces,” coor-
dinated by Tonino Griffero [see EAP, 
summer/fall 2017, p. 1]. 
 
Bradley Rink, 2019. Place 
Ballet in a South African Mini-
bus Taxi Rank. In D. Agbiboa, 
ed., Transport, Transgression 
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and Politics in African Cities. 
NY: Routledge. 
 
This geographer provides an ethnographic 
study of Cape Town’s Mowbray taxi rank, 
one hub of the city’s minibus taxi services. 
Rink writes: “Complexity, fluidity and pre-
cariousness characterize the taxi rank… 
which is a critical point of arrival, depar-
ture, and in-betweenness where vehicles, 
their drivers, guards, and passengers meet 
at the starting and endpoint of their jour-
neys. The taxi rank is at once a place of 
flows, a place of stillness, a place of con-
flict, and a place of confluence.” 
 
John Russon, 2017. Sites of 
Exposure. Bloomington: Indi-
ana Univ. Press. 
 
This philosopher focuses on “our distinc-
tive capacities and the world that provides 
the setting in which we deploy them.” He 
argues that, “in all our affairs we funda-
mentally are dealing with a kind of expo-
sure, a contact with an outside. It is in and 
through this contact with a challenging 
outside that we must make our lives, and 
this book is a study of how we make for 
ourselves a home in this outside, in this 
world to which we are exposed.” 
Russon concludes that “the dynamic in-
teraction of being-exposed and being-at-
home is what defines our life, and this is so 
at every level of our experience—from the 
most basic domains of bodily interaction 
with the physical environment to our polit-
ical engagements with other people and to 
our most personal engagement with inti-
mate matters of meaning and value.” 
 
Dirk van Eck & Roos Pijpers, 
2016. Encounters in Place 
Ballet: A Phenomenological 
Perspective on Older Peo-
ple’s Walking Routines in an 
Urban Park, Area, vol. 49, no. 
2, pp. 166–173. 
 
These geographers draw on the phenome-
nological concept of “place ballet” to “un-
derstand the meanings of encounters be-
tween older people visiting an urban park 
in the city of Eindhoven, the Netherlands.” 
The authors make use of participant obser-
vation, including “a serial interviewing 
strategy, in which older people are accom-
panied on their walks through the park, to 
expose daily walking routines. As part of 
these routines, characterized by clockwork 
precision, they meet fellow park visitors in 
place ballet.” The authors conclude that 
place ballet “sustains an atmosphere of fel-
lowship that encourages people to notice 
and care for each other.” 
 
Troy Vine, 2018. Understand-
ing Goethe’s Polemics 
against Newton. Field Centre 
Research Journal, issue 1 
(May), pp. 36–46. 
 
This researcher provides a critique of phys-
icist Michael Duck’s introduction to the re-
cently-published English translation of the 
polemic part of Goethe’s 1810 Theory of 
Colours, in which Goethe calls into ques-
tion Newton’s light and color experiments 
in his 1704 Optics. 
Drawing on philosopher of science 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, Troy 
argues that Goethe was working metaphys-
ically to call into question the taken-for-
granted way of science assumed by New-
ton: “I thus propose reading [Goethe’s] po-
lemics as an attempt to show that the con-
ceptual framework that underlies New-
ton’s theory—the presentational theory of 
perception, the material theory of light, and 
so forth—is responsible for [explaining 
Goethe’s claim about Newton’s Optics] 
that ‘what is false, true, and what is true, 
false’…. On this reading, Goethe is less 
concerned with demonstrating that Newton 
is engaging in bad physics, but rather in 
bad metaphysics.” 
 
Michael E. Zimmerman, 2008. 
The Singularity: A Crucial 
Phase in Divine Self-Actual-
ization? Cosmos and History, 
vol. 4, nos. 1–2, pp. 347–70. 
 
This philosopher considers the current ar-
gument that the integration of robotics, ar-
tificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and 
genetic engineering may soon generate 
“posthuman beings” that will far surpass 
ordinary humans in “power and intelli-
gence.” The result will be a “singularity,” 
the aims and capacities of which “lie be-
yond our ken.” Zimmerman argues that 
“technological posthumanists, whether 
wittingly or unwittingly, draw upon the 
long-standing Christian discourse of ‘theo-
sis’, according to which humans are capa-
ble of being god or god-like” with the 
eventual result that “humanity achieves ab-
solute consciousness.” Zimmerman ends 
with a set of provocative questions repro-
duced in the sidebar below. 
 
Leaving behind mortal flesh? 
I close with a few questions: many 
centuries from now, will intelligent be-
ings look back upon human history as 
an episode in the biography of cosmic 
Geist? If so, what means are justifiable 
in pursuit of this extraordinary end? 
    Because people have so often com-
mitted terrible atrocities when con-
vinced that they were carrying out 
God’s will, should we keep in mind the 
possibility that transhumanists [i.e., 
supplementing humanness via technol-
ogy and science and thus becoming 
more than human but still holding on 
to some human qualities] and posthu-
manists [i.e., the development of intel-
ligences substantively different and 
greater than humans and thus no longer 
human] are themselves deluded in 
what is behind their visions for the fu-
ture? 
     Does the drive to leave behind mor-
tal flesh divert human energy that 
might otherwise go to restoring the 
life- and human-friendly features of a 
planet that has been ravaged by the 
very science and industry that unwit-
tingly paved the way for trans- and 
posthumanists? Ought there be interna-
tional forums in which these porten-
tous questions can receive serious and 
lengthy hearings? 
     Or will technological innovations 
develop so rapidly that little time will 
remain for inquiry into the potential 
implications of trans- and posthuman-
ism? Will the future envelop us before 
we even have the chance to think 
whether we ought to embrace it? 
     Or will environmental problems 
bring about a grimmer future, one that 
precludes the possibilities—both grand 
and terrifying—that we have been dis-
cussing here? (Michael E. Zimmerman 
2008, pp. 369–70). 
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In Memoriam: David Lowenthal (1923–2018) 
 
eographer David Lowenthal 
died September 18, 2018, in 
London. He was 95 years old 
and Emeritus Professor of Ge-
ography at University College London, 
following many years at the American 
Geographical Society in New York. 
Lowenthal received the British Acad-
emy Medal in 2016 for The Past Is a For-
eign Country—Revisited, honoring “a 
landmark academic achievement which 
has transformed understanding in the hu-
manities and social sciences.” His re-
search and writings ranged from the West 
Indies and American conservationist 
George Perkins Marsh through heritage 
issues to landscape interpretation. When 
he died, Lowenthal was proof-reading his 
just-completed book, Quest for the Unity 
of Knowledge (Routledge, 2018). 
Though best known for his 1985 The 
Past is a Foreign Country (which exam-
ined how societies appraise, understand, 
and make use of the past), Lowenthal was 
a major figure in environment-behavior 
studies in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, 
he participated in the first formal session 
on “environmental perception and behav-
ior” at the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Geographers held in 
Columbus, Ohio. 
The papers from this session were later 
edited by Lowenthal and published as En-
vironmental Perception and Behavior 
(University of Chicago Department of 
Geography, 1967). Illustrating his strong 
interdisciplinary perspective, contribu-
tors included geographers Yi-Fu Tuan, 
Robert Kates, and Lowenthal; as well as 
psychologists Robert Beck and Joseph 
Sonnenfeld; and urban designers Donald 
Appleyard, Kevin Lynch, and John R. 
Reyers. 
For environmental phenomenology, 
Lowenthal is a central figure because of 
his masterly 1961 article, “Geography, 
Experience, and Imagination: Towards a 
Geographical Epistemology.” Replete 
with exhaustive footnotes, this article was 
one of the first efforts to delineate the 
wide range of ways in which human be-
ings relate existentially to the geograph-
ical world in which they find themselves. 
Referring to geographer J. K. Wright’s 
notion of terrae incognitae—people’s 
subjective geographical values and un-
derstandings—Lowenthal wrote that his 
major aim in the article was to explore 
“the nature of these terrae incognitae, and 
the relation between the world outside 
and the pictures in our heads.” 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Low-
enthal taught an annual graduate seminar 
in “environmental perception” at Worces-
ter, Massachusetts’ Clark University, 
where he influenced the thinking and pro-
fessional futures of Anne Buttimer, Da-
vid Seamon, Graham Rowles, and oth-
ers who would become associated with 
“humanistic geography.” 
Lowenthal was a remarkable thinker 
with vast curiosity and a perspicacious 
sensibility regarding people and place. 
His “Geography, Experience, and Imagi-
nation” is perhaps his most concentrated 
achievement and remains a required read-
ing for anyone interested in environmen-
tal phenomenology. 
In memoriam, we reprint a portion of 
this compelling work in the sidebars, be-
low; the many footnotes in the original 
text are not included and can be found in 
the full version of the article (Annals of 
the Association of American Geogra-
phers, vol. 51, no. 3 [1961], pp. 241–60). 
 
At most a partial picture 
Humankind’s best conceivable world 
view is at most a partial picture of the 
world—a picture centered on human 
beings. We inevitably see the universe 
from a human point of view and com-
municate in terms shaped by the exi-
gencies of human life…. 
     Purpose apart, physical and biolog-
ical circumstances restrict human per-
ception. Our native range of sensation 
is limited; other creatures experience 
other worlds than ours. The human 
visual world is richly differentiated, 
compared with that of most species, 
but others see better in the dark, per-
ceive ultraviolet rays as colors, distin-
guish finer detail, or see near and dis-
tant scenes together in better focus. 
     To many creatures, the milieu is 
more audible and more fragrant than 
to us. For every sensation, moreover, 
the human perceptual world varies 
within strict limits; how bright the 
lightning looks, how loud the thunder 
sounds, how wet the rain feels at any 
given moment of a storm depends on 
fixed formulae, whose constants, at 
least, are unique to humans. 
     The instruments of science do per-
mit partial knowledge of other mi-
lieus, real or hypothetical. Blood ordi-
narily appears a uniform, homogene-
ous red to the naked eye; seen through 
a microscope, it becomes yellow par-
ticles in a neutral fluid, while its 
atomic substructure is mostly empty 
space. But such insights do not show 
what it is actually like to see normally 
at a microscopic scale. “The appar-
ently standardized environment of 
flour in a bottle,” Edgar Anderson 
surmises “would not seem undifferen-
tiated to any investigator who had 
once been a flour beetle and who 
knew at firsthand the complexities of 
flour-beetle existence.” 
     The perceptual powers and central 
nervous systems of many species are 
qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, 
different from human’s. We can ob-
serve, but never experience, the role 
of surface tension and molecular 
forces in the lives of small inverte-
brates, the ability of the octopus to 
discriminate tactile impressions by 
taste, of the butterfly to sense forms 
through smell, or of the jellyfish to 
change its size and shape. 
     The tempo of all varieties of expe-
rience is also specific. Time yields 
humans on the average eighteen sepa-
rate impressions, or instants, every 
second; images presented more rap-
idly seem to fuse into continuous mo-
tion. But there are slow-motion fish 
that perceive separate impressions up 
to thirty each second, and snails to 
which a stick that vibrates more than 
four times a second appears to be at 
rest. 
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     As with time, so with space; we 
perceive one of many possible struc-
tures, more hyperbolic than Euclid-
ean. The six cardinal directions are 
not equivalent for us: up and down, 
front and back, left and right have 
particular values because we happen 
to be a special kind of bilaterally sym-
metrical, terrestrial animal. “It is one 
contingent fact about the world,” 
writes Bernard Mayo, “that we attach 
very great importance to things hav-
ing their tops and bottoms in the right 
places; it is another contingent fact 
[about ourselves] that we attach more 
importance to their having their fronts 
and backs in the right places than 
their left and right sides.” Up and 
down are everywhere good and evil: 
heaven and hell, the higher and lower 
instincts, the heights of sublimity and 
the depths of degradation, even the 
higher and the lower latitudes have 
ethical spatial connotations. And left 
and right are scarcely less differenti-
ated. 
     Other species apperceive quite dif-
ferently. Even the fact that physical 
space seems to us three-dimensional 
is partly contingent on our size, on the 
shape of our bodies (an asymmetrical 
torus), and, perhaps, on our semicir-
cular canals; the world of certain birds 
is effectively two-dimensional, and 
some creatures apprehend only one. 
     Human beings’ experienced world 
is, then, only one tree of the forest. 
The difference between this and the 
others is that human beings know 
their tree is not the only one; and yet 
can imagine what the forest as a 
whole might be like. Technology and 
memory extend our images far be-
yond the bounds of direct sensation; 
consciousness of self, of time, of rela-
tionship, and of causality overcome 
the separateness of individual experi-
ence…. 
     Whatever the defects of the gen-
eral consensus, the shared world view 
is essentially well-founded. “We are 
quite willing to admit that there may 
be errors of detail in this knowledge,” 
as Bertrand Russell wrote, referring to 
science, “but we believe them to be 
discoverable and corrigible by the 
methods which have given rise to our 
beliefs, and we do not, as practical 
humans, entertain for a moment the 
hypothesis that the whole edifice may 
be built on insecure foundations” (Da-
vid Lowenthal, pp. 246–48). 
 
The geography of the world 
Every image and idea about the world 
is compounded… of personal experi-
ence, learning, imagination, and 
memory. The places that we live in, 
those we visit and travel through, the 
worlds we read about and see in 
works of art, and the realms of imagi-
nation and fantasy each contribute to 
our images of nature and human be-
ing. All types of experience, from 
those most closely linked with our 
everyday world to those furthest re-
moved, come together to make up our 
individual picture of reality. 
     The surface of the earth is shaped 
for each person by refraction through 
cultural and personal lenses of custom 
and fancy. We are all artists and land-
scape architects, creating order and 
organizing space, time, and causality 
in accordance with our apperceptions 
and predilections. 
     The geography of the world is uni-
fied only by human logic and optics, 
by the light and color of artifice, by 
decorative arrangement, and by ideas 
of the good, the true, and the beautiful 
(David Lowenthal, p. 260). 
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Book Note 
Hendrik Auret, 2019. Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Interpretation of Heidegger’s Philosophy: 
Care, Place and Architecture. London: Routledge. 
 
n the last several years, the writings 
of Norwegian architect and architec-
tural theorist Christian Norberg-
Schulz have been called into ques-
tion by critics of architectural phenome-
nology. In his Architecture’s Historic 
Turn: Phenomenology and the Rise of the 
Postmodern (2010), for example, archi-
tectural theorist Jorge Otero-Pailos ar-
gued that Norberg-Schulz’s understand-
ing of Heidegger’s philosophy was an 
“instrumentalist misreading” that sought 
“to wrest control of architectural history 
from art historians and simultaneously 
seize jurisdiction over architectural aes-
thetics from designers” (p. xxix, p. 181). 
More recently, a special issue of the ar-
chitectural journal Log (2018), provoca-
tively titled, “Disorienting phenomenol-
ogy,” includes contributors who question 
Norberg-Schulz’s work, described by ed-
itor Bryan Norwood as a “root 
subjectivity” that “we can 
characterize as essentially col-
onizing, enlightened, white, 
straight, male, and able-bod-
ied” (p. 12). Or as contributor 
Jos Boys makes the point, 
Norberg-Schulz (as well as 
Gaston Bachelard and Peter 
Zumthor) expresses “a shared 
belonging that assumes its 
own commonsense universal-
ity while simultaneously mak-
ing concrete a normative order 
in which some bodies are pre-
sent and others are absent” (p. 
64). 
As a counter to these criti-
cisms of Norberg-Schulz’s 
thinking, South African archi-
tect and architectural theorist 
Heindrik Auret Christian 
Norberg-Schulz’s Interpreta-
tion of Heidegger’s Philoso-
phy is a welcome rejoinder be-
cause he offers a balanced cri-
tique of the Norwegian’s inter-
pretation of phenomenological 
philosopher Martin Heidegger and ar-
gues that Norberg-Schulz’s thinking 
might be better clarified and grounded 
through a way of being that Auret calls 
“the art of care.” He writes, 
 
I believe that there is a way to overcome 
Norberg-Schulz’s one-sided reliance on 
continuity and change and once again 
breathe life into architectural place-mak-
ing. Architecture, besides being the ‘art 
of place’, is also ‘an art of care’. Archi-
tects need to be mindful of time, instead of 
continuously trying to overcome or trans-
cend it. This demands a certain measure 
of humility and restraint, but also calls 
for the most resolute dedication to unveil-
ing the Moment of revelation; the moment 
when the unique living of a shared way of 
life finds affirmation in architectural 
making (p. 4). 
 
The sidebar, below, includes passages 
from the last chapter of Auret’s book. 
                                                                                 
Care and Place 
If architecture is to be understood as 
livskunst [Norberg-Schulz’s Norwe-
gian term for the “art of the experi-
ence of living”], architects not only 
need to illuminate the life-place total-
ity as an existential space between 
earth and sky but should also recog-
nize the temporal role of care and its 
connections to mortality and the di-
vine. 
     Instead of constituting two isolated 
concepts, care and place reveal com-
pelling facts about each other. Place 
reveals the way in which care always 
already identifies with and is drawn to 
a concrete region between earth and 
sky. Care reveals place not only as a 
concrete topological reality but as an 
appropriated region of concern. The 
interaction of place and care consti-
tutes a lived regioning. Livskunst pre-
sents a way of making and appreciat-
ing architecture appropriate to the 
concerned Being of the intentional … 
(p. 203). 
 
Works of architectural livskunst 
stand between heaven and earth as po-
etic proclamations of the ecstatic con-
cern governing the relationships be-
tween mortal beings of care and the 
place as a region of concern under the 
sway of a guardian spirit; a fourfold 
regioning in which Dasein, the being 
of care, is always already between 
earth and sky, birth and death. 
     In these moments, fleeting but 
serving as a vanguard against half-
heartedness, the constructs that seem 
to endure as care and place are fused 
in the ecstatic openness and steadfast 
captivation of livskunst (p. 206). 
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Book Note 
Edward S. Casey, 2017. The World on Edge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
 
 
he World on Edge is the latest 
book by philosopher Edward 
Casey, whose Getting Back 
into Place (1993/2009) and 
The Fate of Place (1997) have been two 
primary engines for the robust recent re-
search in place phenomenology. Broadly, 
The World on Edge can be described as a 
phenomenology of edges, which are cru-
cial to human experience because  
 
our life consists of one encounter with 
edges after another—some benignly sup-
portive, others obstructive, but others dis-
tinctly traumatic—and as we grow up we 
move into increasingly complex and de-
manding edge circumstances. Much ema-
nates from edges: energy, definition, pro-
vide, outreach. Much begins with edges, 
whether in painting, politics, 
or poetry, and everything 
ends with edges: every 
thing and every event ter-
minates in edges, including 
the event of death as the ul-
timate edge of our life” (p. 
xv). 
In generating a more ex-
act description of edges, 
Casey first considers sev-
eral broad modes of physi-
cal edges, including bor-
ders, boundaries, surfaces, 
and limits as well as the 
more ephemeral edges that 
mark places and events. 
Second, he examines hu-
man-made vs. natural 
edges by contrasting urban 
and wilderness situations. 
Third, he considered bodily 
edges, which “are psychi-
cal rather than physical”; 
and, last, the edges of earth 
and sky. Casey uses this 
outline “to show how edges 
pervade our inner as well as 
our outer lives, and how they 
arise in the interaction be-
tween human beings and what surrounds 
them…. For in truth edges are every-
where: as far as we can see and as close 
as we can touch” (p. xix). 
The first sidebar below provides Ca-
sey’s introduction to edges; the second re-
produces passages from his discussion of 
edges as they relate to places. 
                                                                                 
Edges as a formative force 
This book pursues the thesis that 
edges are constitutive not only of 
what we perceive, but also of what we 
think and of the places and events in 
which we are situated. Edges do much 
more than demarcate or delimit spa-
tial spread or temporal extent, being a 
formative force of their own. 
     I shall maintain that the role of 
edges is central to the drama of expe-
rience at every level—perceptual, 
practical, cognitive, aesthetic, emo-
tional, intersubjective. Far from being 
a negligible aspect of ordinary experi-
ence, they are an extraordinary and 
quite constructive (though also at 
times destructive) basis of this experi-
ence. 
     Yet edges have been almost en-
tirely overlooked in previous philo-
sophical accounts of human experi-
ence. At most they are noted and then 
passed over in favor of abiding philo-
sophical preoccupations such as the 
nature of truth, the verification of 
knowledge claims, or the evidential 
nature of sensory perception. The na-
ture of edges has been quite literally 
marginalized. 
     But what if edges are not merely 
incidental aspects of perception? 
What if they are distinct presences in 
their own right—indispensable not 
just to perception but also to many 
other kinds and parts of our experi-
ence of the world? 
     Edges, I contend here, are essential 
to being a thing or a thought, a place 
or an event—and, by extension, a per-
son or an artwork. Without edges, 
none of these could be what they are. 
Edges contribute to the peculiar char-
acter of that which they constitute, its 
status as this rather than that. Nothing 
distinct or finite can emerge except as 
edged—and edged in a specific man-
ner that helps to form its unique iden-
tity (p. xiii). 
 
                                                                                 
The singularity of place edges 
Places are peculiar in that all their 
edges exhibit edge/edge relations—
every edge of a place is interactive 
with other edges rather than inde-
pendent or freestanding. There is no 
edge of a place that does not emerge 
from the way that place is situated in 
its own larger environments and thus 
in relation to a plethora of other edges 
in these environs, including those of 
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the particular things that populate it. 
With rare exceptions, the edges of a 
place interact with those of the sur-
rounding world in manifold and sub-
tle ways…. In the case of edges of 
laces, all of them are interactive with 
other edges—those of its own occu-
pants as well as those of other places 
and what is in them. 
 
Several sorts of edge conspire in the 
making of a single place. To be a 
place at all is to possess a multiplicity 
of edge types. To call places “open 
textures” [i.e., porous and extending 
places beyond themselves] … is to 
contrast them with sites, which are 
spaces determined in strict terms by 
the closure effected by imposed or 
imputed edges, which tend to be recti-
linear (as in building sites). 
     Moreover, where a material thing 
tends to feature one consistent kind of 
edge [e.g., the margin around a 
printed page], a place characteristi-
cally possesses a variety of edge-
types. Thought there are more compli-
cated places than the corner of W. 
110th Street [in New York City] where 
I live, this particular place proves to 
be rife with edges of disparate sorts—
so many, in fact, that my description 
of it could continue indefinitely. A 
proliferation of edges inheres in any 
given place, more so than for any 
given thing in that place. 
     A place is an especially powerful 
catchment area of edges, absorbing 
and exhibiting a variety of them—nat-
ural and artificial, conspicuous and 
understated, fully presented or only 
adumbrated. This reflects the fact that 
a place has no single definitive edge, 
no set limit in any strict sense. To 
have a definite edge is a basic feature 
of sites, by contrast; but places… are 
not so restricted. Consider how places 
we designate by phrases such as “Gra-
mercy Park” or “Battery Park”… re-
fuse to be characterized as stopping or 
starting at a certain precise point, 
whatever city maps may claim. 
     By the same token, when places… 
intersect, they do so in diffuse ways 
that defy definite, much less com-
plete, description. South Harlem 
merges into the Upper West Side 
across Morningside Park, which acts 
as a buffer zone between [the two], at 
once connecting and separating them. 
Yet no local inhabitant is likely to say 
that South Harlem extends only to a 
particular point—say, to Manhattan 
Avenue but not one yard beyond. 
     In Morningside Park (which abuts 
Manhattan Avenue), Harlem residents 
mix with Upper West Side residents 
and Columbia University students. 
Such intermediary or liminal spaces 
abound in cities. Their existence 
makes it difficult to establish a strict 
border between two or more parts of 
the city. It is notoriously difficult to 
specify, for example, just where city 
neighborhoods begin or end… 
     In short, the edges of places are 
more like boundaries than borders. 
They share with boundaries an inher-
ent openness and vagueness of spatial 
extent. These two qualities are present 
here in such elementary phenomena 
as being able to walk back and forth 
between different places in a city with 
comparative freedom—with many op-
portunities for entry and exit: from 
South Harlem I can approach Colum-
bia University by any number of 
streets ranging from 110th Street to 
120th Street and across the multiple 
walkways of Morningside Park. 
     It is as if places… provide many 
point of access, some newly evolving, 
some of more ancient vintage—in di-
rect contrast with sites, whose very 
definition and existence depends on 
the maintenance of tightly contained 
and rigid limits that resist change. 
Such limits resemble borders much 
more than boundaries. 
 
Despite its fuzzy fringes, which fa-
cilitate close links to a larger con-
structed or natural environment, a 
place is always a whole of some sort, 
at some scale; it is equivalent to this 
part of the world, this neighborhood, 
this street scene, this hotel lobby. 
     It may not have a proper name or 
toponym, but is still an integral, intu-
ited something: a place is never sheer 
vapor or mere myth; it is not nothing, 
nor does it come from nothing. The 
fact that it comes always with edges 
means that it cannot be entirely nebu-
lous: even fuzzy edges give a certain 
definition and shape to a place. 
     Indeed, its very identity as a place 
comes in significant measure from its 
being distinctively edged. Its edges 
are not just where a place fades out or 
ends. Prominent as the ending of a 
place may be, especially when 
marked as such, a place’s edges also 
convey the basic character of the 
place itself, its physiognomy as well 
as its ingression into a larger encom-
passing world. Such edges are not 
merely the exoskeleton of that place 
but are also an integral part of its very 
being, essential to its being the place 
it is (p. 76, pp. 77–78, p. 79). 
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Seeing and Understanding Holistically 
Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature—Part II 
Henri Bortoft 
 
Bortoft (1938–2012) was a philosopher, physicist, and science educator who wrote Taking Appearance Seriously (2012) and the 
influential Wholeness of Nature (1996). This essay was originally the second and third parts of a paper for the conference, “Goe-
thean Science in Holistic Perspective: Scientific, Ethical, and Educational Implications,” held at Columbia University’s Teacher 
College, New York City, May 20–22, 1999. The first part of this paper was published in the summer/fall 2018 issue of EAP; addi-
tional parts will be included in future EAPs. Note that, in the original written version of his talk, Bortoft does not provide complete 
references. Here, we have added citations as available, but some works remain unreferenced. The editor thanks Stephen Wood for 
assistance in locating references. The essay is published with the permission of Jacqueline Bortoft. © 2019 Jacqueline Bortoft. 
 
s I explained in Part I of this es-
say, I am interested in Goethe’s 
work as it contributes to a sci-
ence of wholeness. In locating 
Goethe’s contribution to this effort, I begin 
by considering his work in the context of 
the historical development of modern sci-
ence—a task that Goethe himself found of 
considerable interest. 
In spite of our shifting understanding of 
the nature of science, the “myth” of empir-
icism continues today to dominate science 
education and popular understanding. This 
perspective assumes that scientific 
knowledge is based directly on the experi-
ence of the senses. Empirical observations 
and experiments are the grounds upon 
which scientific knowledge is built. In this 
view, modern science began when human 
beings “came to their senses” and no 
longer relied on religious or philosophical 
speculation. 
The history of science, however, does 
not support this view. In fact, when we 
look at the major scientific developments 
from Copernicus to Newton, we find that 
what actually unfolded was the opposite: 
people “took leave of their senses” in favor 
of the mathematical. From the beginning, 
modern science elevated the mathematical 
above all other aspects of nature. Renais-
sance scientists like Galileo contended that 
the experience of the senses was an illusion 
and that reality was to be discovered accu-
rately only by going behind experiential 
appearances to discover mathematical rela-
tionships, ratios, and harmonies not visible 
to the senses directly.  
But why should the mathematical be el-
evated above all other factors with the con-
sequent demotion to secondary status of all 
non-mathematical aspects of a phenome-
non? There was nothing like this demotion 
in medieval science, where mathematical 
certainty had its place but was not given 
the privileged status of the way to truth. 
Furthermore, there was no objective basis 
for this demotion in that no one suddenly 
“discovered” that reality is only mathemat-
ical. 
In fact, this emphasis on the mathemati-
cal had no “scientific” basis. It was not dis-
covered by science but incorporated into 
science. Grounded in the cultural-histori-
cal ethos of the time, this mathematical 
emphasis points to a free-standing decision 
to do science in this way. “Free-standing” 
is the crux here, since there is nothing in-
herent in nature that requires consideration 
only in terms of its mathematical aspects. 
There is no intrinsic scientific basis for this 
mathematical choice. Rather, this choice 
works as a precept: this is how science will 
be done and specifies what counts as “sci-
entific.” The result is a new organizing 
idea that transforms science itself. 
 
The historicity of science 
The rejection of the senses and the affirma-
tion of mathematics as the source of truth 
arose from the way in which Platonic phi-
losophy was interpreted in the Renaissance 
(together with the role of the Sun as repre-
sentative of God in the visible world and 
therefore the center of that world). 
This shift in understanding relates to 
what historians of science now refer to as 
the intrinsic historicity of science: that cul-
tural-historical context enters into the very 
form that scientific knowledge takes. This 
recognition of an intrinsic historical di-
mension means that science is not, as is of-
ten assumed, a self-founding and self-gen-
erating activity with absolute foundations. 
Nor does this contextual recognition mean 
that scientific knowledge is somehow arbi-
trary or relative in a subjective sense. What 
it does mean is that nature is portrayed in 
its mathematical aspect because that aspect 
is an integral part of what nature is. But this 
way of understanding does not preclude 
that there are other ways in which nature 
can manifest and thus be. 
Once, however, scientists embark on a 
research program emphasizing mathemati-
cal knowledge, the possibility of under-
standing nature in other ways is mostly set 
aside. At least at first, there was no sugges-
tion that sensory qualities were not real as-
pects of the world, even if they were not 
considered to be as fundamental as na-
ture’s mathematical dimension. 
Over time, however, sensory qualities 
were denied any “objective” reality in 
themselves and, instead, were taken to be 
entirely subjective. Galileo seems to have 
first introduced this ontological bifurcation 
into physics, and this point of view was 
subsequently adopted by others, most no-
tably Descartes. The result was that any-
thing in nature not mathematical (i.e., iden-
tifiable via quantity) was assumed to be 
“subjective” and thereby excluded. The 
eventual result was the impoverishment of 
nature [1]. 
 
Incorporating secondary qualities 
Goethe recognized that this elevation of 
the mathematical above other qualities of 
nature was unwarranted in that the empha-
sis had no intrinsic validity. He did not 
seek to devalue the mathematical approach 
A 
 12 
 
but to restore the distinction between the 
sciences and mathematics in situations 
where this distinction had become con-
fused, thus distorting a fuller understand-
ing of nature [2]. 
His major aim was to renew the signifi-
cance of the so-called “secondary” quali-
ties of the natural world. In his light stud-
ies, for example, he took color as a phe-
nomenon in its own right and, by giving at-
tention to the phenomenality of color, he 
sought to discover the laws of color phe-
nomenologically. He hoped to locate the 
necessary connections that constitute the 
“inner logic” of the qualities of color (such 
“laws” being the equivalent in a phenome-
nological science of the quality of color to 
the mathematical laws in the quantitative 
science of light). 
The irony is that, in returning directly to 
the phenomenon via firsthand, sensuous 
experience, Goethe was doing what many 
people assume science does anyway but 
which in fact is not done in its mathemati-
cal version. 
 
A dynamic way of seeing 
Goethe’s method for a science of color can 
be specified in one word: attention. He 
gives attention to the phenomenon in ques-
tion and thereby strives to guard against the 
introduction of any theoretical factors out-
side the phenomenon. Such external fac-
tors could only have the effect of obscuring 
the necessary connections within the phe-
nomenon itself and substituting for the per-
ception of necessity in the phenomenon 
what is no more than an external explana-
tion—“external,” that is, as compared to 
the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon it-
self [3]. 
Goethe directed attention to the phenom-
enon in two stages. First, he attempted an 
active seeing, a way of encountering the 
phenomenon considerably different from a 
taken-for-granted registering of sense im-
pressions. In active seeing, one works to 
reverse the direction of seeing so as to go 
from the observer into the observed (rather 
than from the observed to the observer, 
which is the habitual way in which one 
looks and sees). 
This effort of active seeing is followed 
by what Goethe called exact sensorial im-
agination, in which one attempts, without 
looking, to re-envision the original en-
counter. The effort is an imaginative but 
accurate consciousness of the phenomenon 
[4]. Unlike any fanciful imagination that 
embroiders the phenomenon and envisions 
it as something more or less than it is, the 
aim of exact sensorial imagination is to be 
as true as possible to the perceived phe-
nomenon. But this is not a static activity as 
if the aim were just to achieve an “inner” 
picturing of the phenomenon. Because we 
attempt to make the imaginative seeing 
happen in a way that we do not need to do 
with “outer” perception, there begins to be 
movement and flexibility in our inner pic-
turing. 
It is by this means that consciousness 
shifts, and one becomes a participant in the 
coming-into-being of the phenomenon ra-
ther than an onlooker observing a finished 
product. This shift of consciousness—
from static observations to unfolding pro-
cess—is the key to Goethe’s dynamic way 
of seeing. It is this different way of encoun-
tering nature that is Goethe’s most valua-
ble potential contribution for deepening 
our understanding today [5]. 
 
Goethe’s prism experiments 
We can get some idea of Goethe’s method 
by considering the experience of looking 
through a prism at a white rectangle with a 
black background. One sees colors at the 
rectangle’s horizontal edges: red, orange, 
yellow at one edge; violet and light blue at 
the other. 
When we begin looking, we tend to fo-
cus on distinguishing colors. We give at-
tention to the quality of each color and then 
try to do for ourselves, via exact sensorial 
imagination, what nature provides via di-
rect experience. We visualize the colors at 
each edge, seeing them together in the or-
der in which they appear. By making our-
selves reproduce the phenomenon we have 
seen in our mind’s eye imaginatively, we 
become aware of an aspect of the colors 
subtler than their separation into “red,” 
“orange,” “yellow,” and so forth. 
One comes to realize that the colors are 
not just juxtaposed externally but belong 
together. There is a “belongingness” 
among the colors at the two edges not vis-
ible in sense experience alone. One can ex-
press this quality by calling it “unity with-
out unification” (though perhaps “whole-
ness” is preferable to “unity” here). 
One can recognize this “belongingness” 
in Heidegger’s distinction between “be-
longing together” and “belonging to-
gether.” In the former, the “belonging” de-
termines the “together,” whereas in the lat-
ter the “together” determines the “belong-
ing.” In the latter case, we may “together” 
things that don’t “belong” or simply miss 
the way in which things already “belong” 
independently of any attempt on our part to 
“together” them [6]. 
In workshops, it happens quite often that 
one or two participants spontaneously ex-
perience a “movement” in the colors at the 
edges. For example, one participant might 
say that “the colors seem to grow out of 
one another,” or someone else suggests 
that “the boundaries of the colors have dis-
solved, and I feel like I’m ‘swimming’ 
from one color into another.” 
Goethe himself commented that no color 
can be considered as stationary [7]. For 
participants not coming to this shifting pat-
tern directly, one can provide a “guided” 
visualization from white to pale yellow, or-
ange, red, and black, and then the reverse. 
Practicing this shifting pattern of visualiz-
ing helps to facilitate a flexibility of seeing 
[8]. 
Working with exact sensorial imagina-
tion in this dynamic way has the effect of 
strengthening the initially weak sense of 
the colors belonging together. One result is 
that we begin to experience a quality of ne-
cessity in the colors. Instead of red, orange, 
and yellow experienced as merely contin-
gent—as if the order of these colors were 
just accidental—we experience the order 
in the qualities as necessary. 
One way to become more aware of this 
non-contingent belonging is to visualize an 
incorrect color sequence—e.g., red, blue, 
yellow. Most participants recognize that 
this arrangement simply does not fit: “The 
blue popped out when I tried to make it go 
between red and yellow. And the blue 
makes a separation between the red and 
yellow. They no longer seem together” [9]. 
It is crucial to our understanding of Goe-
the’s way of science that we can come to 
have the experience of necessity of the phe-
nomenon itself. We are familiar with this 
requirement in mathematics, to which it is 
usually supposed that the intuition of ne-
cessity is restricted. 
It is here that Goethe’s way of science 
becomes phenomenological instead of be-
ing either phenomenal-empirical or hypo-
thetical-speculative. In both the latter situ-
ations, one goes outside the phenomenon 
to introduce elements of another kind from 
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outside the domain of color qualities them-
selves—e.g., wavelengths and their instru-
mental measurement. 
In rephrasing the phenomenon in these 
ways, there is no longer any necessity 
within the phenomenon. It has been con-
verted into something other than itself. 
When we see the necessity, then it is part 
of understanding the phenomenon that 
there is no need to look beyond it for any-
thing further. This point is very difficult to 
explain to anyone who has not yet had the 
experience of necessity [10]. 
A corollary is that, when we have not 
reached the experience of necessity, then 
we feel impelled to search for some expla-
nation external to the phenomenon. One 
recognizes this importance of necessity in 
Goethe’s often-quoted remarks: 
 
▪ Let the facts themselves speak for their 
theory. 
▪ Don’t look for anything behind the 
phenomena; they are themselves the 
theory. 
▪ The greatest achievement would be to 
understand that everything factual is 
already its own theory [11]. 
 
The Urphänomen 
There is an awkward point in workshops 
on Goethe’s approach to color in which 
participants must make a transition from 
the experiential investigation to what Goe-
the called the Urphänomen—the primal or 
archetypal phenomenon of color. Goethe 
does not mention this transition in “Contri-
butions to Optics” (1792), in which he lim-
its himself to an investigation of the for-
mation of colors at different boundaries 
when seen through the prism [12]. 
The “awkward point” is that the intro-
duction of the primal phenomenon seems 
like a discontinuity—a sudden jump in see-
ing. For sure, the workshop leader can 
smooth this transition over as a conjuror 
does when he comes to a “gap” in his per-
formance that he covers in a way that spec-
tators don’t notice. But the fact remains 
that Goethe does not describe how he came 
to his claim regarding the Urphänomen 
that “One instance is worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself”—a claim that, in 
relation to color, he found in the shifting 
colors of the sun and sky [13]. 
Goethe speaks of this jump from lived 
experiences of color to the broader Ur-
phänomen as an aperçu—a sudden mo-
ment of insight and understanding. But this 
explanation does not tell us how Goethe 
came to relate these particular facts—i.e., 
the changing colors of the sun and sky—to 
the original prism experiments [14]. 
This recognition that there must be an 
“instance worth a thousand, bearing all 
within itself,” indicates that Goethe’s way 
of proceeding is phenomenological rather 
than empirical. An empirical procedure 
would collect many different instances of a 
phenomenon and compare them to find 
something they had in common. The pres-
ence of this commonality would then be 
taken to be essential for the occurrence of 
the phenomenon. An empirical approach 
involves induction—i.e., generalization 
arising from many cases. 
In a phenomenological approach, in con-
trast, only one instance is needed to see 
what is essential. The difference is that, 
phenomenologically, we see the necessary 
principle in the facts. We do not infer, de-
duce, or construct this principle but see it 
directly. This is not to say that such seeing 
always happens clearly at once. Rather, the 
recognition will more likely be achieved 
only with difficulty because, in many in-
stances, there will be contingent and acci-
dental factors that obscure what is neces-
sary and essential. 
What is needed is an instance in which 
these “asides” are reduced to such a degree 
that what is necessary and essential—i.e., 
the pure phenomenon—shines forth in see-
ing. This is the phenomenological ground-
ing for the “One instance worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself.” 
 
Universal and particular together 
What we realize in Goethe’s phrasing here 
is the emphasis on the universal in the par-
ticular. We don’t see the particular as just 
an instance of the universal in the way that 
a particular triangle is an instance of the 
universal “triangle.” Rather, we see the 
universal in the particular so that, instead 
of being merely an instance of the univer-
sal, the particular becomes a “window” 
through which we see the universal. Or we 
might say that the particular is a “mirror” 
in which the universal appears. 
This seeing is twofold—i.e., simultane-
ously universal and particular. Crucially, 
however, there is no separation. The uni-
versal is twofold but non-dual; it is not “be-
hind” the particular and separate from it. 
The philosopher Ernst Cassirer empha-
sized that, for Goethe, “the particular and 
the universal are not only intimately con-
nected but… they interpenetrate one an-
other.” Goethe said that “The universal and 
the particular coincide: the particular is the 
universal itself appearing under different 
conditions.” The mode of consciousness 
that sees the universal in the particular is 
“inside out” to that which sees the particu-
lar as merely an instance of the universal. 
In relation to Goethe’s color studies, one 
realizes that, via the varying colors of sun 
and sky, we see how colors arise from light 
and dark alone—the darker colors arising 
from light overcoming darkness; the 
lighter colors, from darkness overcoming 
light. The qualities of the different colors 
become intelligible in themselves. 
In addition, the order of the colors be-
comes intelligible, and the quality of ne-
cessity is now grounded in the coming into 
being of the phenomenon itself—as also 
does the experience of the belonging to-
gether of the colors, particularly the two 
different edge-color phenomena, which are 
now seen to belong together as a dynamic 
polarity. 
Where with the senses we see separate-
ness, we can simultaneously see whole-
ness—as we now see the wholeness of the 
yellow sun and the blue sky, which are oth-
erwise just juxtaposed facts. Where before 
there was only contingency, there is now 
necessity grounded in the coming into be-
ing of the phenomenon. 
This dynamic relationship is seen espe-
cially when the “poles” of the two color 
edges are brought together and green ap-
pears [15]. Now for the first time we have 
the colors that Newton described as the 
“spectrum of light” and that he took as the 
beginning of his investigation. But now, 
instead of being just a contingent arrange-
ment of colors, this spectrum is a necessary 
whole and intelligible as such. Each color 
is intelligible in itself and hence in relation 
to the others, in terms of its coming into 
being. 
Newton wrote about the origin of the 
colors seen with the prism, but the so-
called “spectrum of light” that he took as 
his starting point is a secondarily derived 
phenomenon instead of the simple phe-
nomenon he took it to be. He began with 
what is in fact already a “finished product” 
that he then tried to explain by projecting 
the colors back into light, imagining them 
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already there but not visible until separated 
by the action of the prism. Newton’s claim 
was that the prism simply brings out what 
is already there [16]. 
Newtons’ understanding here reminds 
one of the person who, in Rumi’s saying, 
tries to “reach the milk by way of the 
cheese.” What Newton claims about the 
origin of color is like saying that cheese 
comes from milk because it is in the milk 
already. He no more describes the origin of 
color than this saying describes the origin 
of cheese. 
Goethe, on the other hand, does describe 
the origin of color. He shows how the col-
ors are “excited” in the light when condi-
tions are right. When conditions cease, the 
colors cease. Instead of starting with a phe-
nomenon that is a “finished product”—the 
so-called spectrum of colors—he follows 
through the coming into being of this phe-
nomenon. In doing so, he consciously par-
ticipates in the phenomenon instead of re-
maining an independent onlooker. 
 
Different movements of thinking 
In making this transition from the phenom-
enon in its finished state to its coming into 
being, Goethe ends up where we usually 
begin. What he does, in effect, is to go back 
“upstream” and “flow down” again to fin-
ish where the standard Newtonian explana-
tion begins, a direction of understanding 
that simply flows further “downstream” 
while giving the illusion that it is returning 
to the source by back-projecting the fin-
ished product into the origin. 
There are two quite different movements 
of thinking here. If we cannot transform 
from the product into the producing, then 
our efforts at explanation can only take us 
further away from what we imagine they 
take us toward. The result is Goethe’s dy-
namic mode of consciousness: to follow 
the coming into being of the phenomenon 
instead of beginning with the phenomenon 
in its finished state. This different way of 
seeing and thinking may be his most im-
portant contribution to our understanding 
today. 
 
Notes 
1. There are no grounds for this way of understand-
ing nature other than the elevation of the mathemati-
cal, for which, in turn, there are no grounds other than 
cultural-historical context. This situation did not stop 
thinkers from trying to offer foundations, but the key 
point is that there is no intrinsic scientific foundation. 
Descartes made the most notable effort to provide this 
foundation by arguing that the new science of mathe-
matical physics was grounded both ontologically and 
methodologically in God. For further discussion, see 
Bortoft 1996, chaps. 1–3. 
2. Note the two following passages from Goethe: 
 
An important task: to banish mathematical-philo-
sophical theories from those areas of physical science 
where they impede rather than advance knowledge, 
those areas where a one-sided development in mod-
ern scientific education has made such perverse use 
of them. 
 
I can receive mathematics as the most sublime and 
useful science, so long as they are applied in their 
proper place; but I cannot commend the misuse of 
them in matters which do not belong to their sphere, 
and in which, noble science as they are, they seem to 
be mere nonsense. As if, forsooth! Things only exist 
when they can be mathematically demonstrated. It 
would be foolish for a man not to believe his mistress’ 
love because she could not prove it to him mathemat-
ically. She can mathematically prove her dowry, but 
not her love! 
 
3. For a discussion of how this approach differed 
from Newton’s work on light and color, see Bortoft 
1996, pp. 205–07; pp. 223–26. Also see Bortoft 1971, 
1982, 1985, 1986, 2012, 2013. 
4. Exact sensorial imagination is often mislead-
ingly described as producing a mental image in con-
sciousness, whereas phenomenologically it is not a 
content of consciousness but a mode of consciousness 
and a special kind of intentionality. 
5. Hjalmar Hegge (1987) identified the practice of 
exact sensorial imagination as the means by which 
necessary connections can be seen within the domain 
of qualities. Mastering Goethe’s method of seeing and 
understanding amounts to a way of developing the 
mode of consciousness needed for Goethe’s way of 
science. In other words, the activity of Goethean sci-
ence is an educational activity. It is the education of a 
mode of consciousness. 
6. For a thorough explication of “belonging to-
gether” versus “belonging together,” see Bortoft, 
1996, pp. 3–26; 290–320. 
7. See Theory of Colours, ⁋ 772 (Goethe 1970). 
8. Older workshop participants sometimes have 
more difficulty with exact sensorial imagination, per-
haps because the capacity atrophies through lack of 
use. But it can be restored given time. 
9. Biologist Brian Goodwin first suggested this ef-
fort to visualize a wrong color sequence. 
10. The awkwardness is that we usually don’t rec-
ognize that we were experiencing the order as contin-
gent and accidental until after we have begun to ex-
perience the quality of necessity—a situation that 
makes describing this difference difficult. 
11. One thinks of related comments by Wittgen-
stein: “A phenomenon isn’t a symptom of something 
else. It is the reality” (Wittgenstein 1953, section 
126). Or “Since everything lies open to view, there is 
nothing to explain” (Wittgenstein 1964, p. 283). 
Bortoft discusses Wittgenstein’s relation to Goethe in 
part I of this essay; see EAP, fall/winter 2018—Ed. 
12. Goethe understood the Urphänomen of color to 
be the tension between light and darkness—what he 
described poetically as “colors as the deeds and suf-
ferings of light.” Lightness overcome by darkness 
leads to the lighter colors of yellow, orange, and red, 
while darkness overcome by lightness leads to the 
darker colors of blue and indigo. Goethe argued that, 
in nature, the Urphänomen could be seen in the sun’s 
shifting color—from yellow at midday to orange and 
red while setting; or in mountain ridges receding in 
the distance, with nearer ridges indigo and farther 
ridges blue. Goethe understood the blue of the sky as 
the lightness of the atmosphere in front of the dark-
ness of outer space. 
13. See note 12. 
14. My guess is he found the idea of the Urphäno-
men in a book. This determination is not unusual—
Copernicus, for example, explained that he found the 
idea for the heliocentric universe in ancient books. In 
this sense, it is not what one finds but what he or she 
does with it that counts. We know that Goethe re-
searched thoroughly the history of color, and he may 
well have found his “One instance worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself” in the writings of the Renais-
sance painters—Leonardo da Vinci perhaps? If this is 
true, it would explain why there seems to be such a 
“jump” when presenting Goethe’s work on color in 
workshops. Nevertheless, by whatever means Goethe 
came to it, the recognition that there is a connection 
between the prismatic colors and the colors of the sun 
and sky is an insight in itself. For further discussion 
of the Urphänomen, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 231–46. 
15. Significantly, when one uses the prism to view 
a black rectangle on a white background, one sees 
how the two colored edges move together in reverse 
order and “blend” to generate a new color—a ruby-
magenta, or “peach blossom,” that is the complemen-
tary color to green. One can now form a circle that 
marks Goethe’s color wheel based on complementary 
colors. The result is a circle that is a dynamic whole 
in which, as Goethe wrote, “no color can be consid-
ered stationary.” 
16. For a discussion of the ambiguities and hidden in-
fluences in Newton’s 1672 paper to the Royal Soci-
ety, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 192–212. 
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“Emigration, forced or chosen, across na-
tional frontiers or from village to metrop-
olis, is the quintessential experience of our 
time.” 
 
—John Berger, And Our Faces, 
My Heart, Brief as Photos
 
 
 write from Amsterdam where, for 
the time being, I live and work. My 
condition as a new immigrant has 
prompted passing strange itches, 
twitches, aches, and musings on the nature 
of language. Committing wandering 
thoughts to paper seems one way to comb 
them out. Sharing can’t hurt. 
I’m here by choice and, like many, relish 
the novelty of place as it awakens groggy 
nerve endings, unfamiliar smells, colors, 
tastes, and sounds constituting a cup of 
phenomenological espresso. Awarenesses 
of new surrounds, mine at least, seem to 
surface onion-esquely. Some layers peel 
off thin and fast, others thick and slow, 
some opaquely conceal following layers, 
others shimmer permeable and translucent, 
but they come in succession. 
A first hard slap on the ears. Multiple 
tongues both recognizable and not make 
me giddy. Opportunities to retrieve from 
the dusty attics of my own mind unused 
skills in French and German add to the 
buzz. I had been speaking nothing but 
American English for a dozen years. 
There’s nothing wrong with American 
English, but all day, every day? Isn’t that a 
bit like leek soup for every single meal? 
Quick on the heels of initial euphoria 
comes the hilarity of screwing up. I’ve 
never really minded making a fool of my-
self. I need face cream. I enter a drug store. 
Locate the cosmetics counter. See a poster 
of young beauty with glowing skin. Below 
the poster, little white tubes, pink caps, and 
labels I can’t read. Face cream. Right? 
Can’t get that wrong, right? Well, try a few 
days with deodorant paste on your mug. 
All puckered up. Never mind. At least 
there was no sweat on this brow. 
More slowly, using my linguistic body 
as a temperature gauge, I encounter em-
bedded layers of lingering war memories. 
The past breathes. Amsterdam faces and 
embraces the sea but turns its back coldly 
on the hinterland. Should you, in a make-
a-fool-of-yourself-moment, blurt out 
Vielen Dank instead of Danke well or 
bezahlen rather than betalen, you will 
stand corrected immediately. These easy-
going burghers will forgive most every 
clumsiness, but they don’t like that one. 
Actually, the Dutch are more than just 
forgiving of mistakes. As a small, practical 
nation, they don’t really expect their for-
eigners to learn Nederlands at all. In this 
hub of transaction and transport, what pre-
vails as lingua franca is Amsterdamer Eng-
lish. Easily rather crude, Amsterdamer 
English has few rules. Swear words and 
references to human anatomy, including 
yours, your mother’s, sister’s, or aunt’s, 
are accepted currency but, for reason not 
yet clear to me, it is very bad form to say 
God damn. Street vocabulary runs rather 
adolescent—Wow. Cool. Idiomatic expres-
sions are banned, and should you unthink-
ingly confound a conversation by saying 
something like So we’re in like Flynn, you 
will be told not to do that sort of thing. 
Speech is KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid.  
 
 ran across a short article in the 
DutchNews.nl of June 3, 2018, by Al-
lison Edwards, an Australian-born res-
ident, who completed a 2014 thesis at the 
University of Leiden with the title, English 
in the Netherlands: Functions, Forms, and 
Attitudes. Edwards found a few distinctive 
grammatical characteristics of Amster-
damer English. Idiosyncrasies include 
front-loaded sentences (Especially for our 
external clients, this could be an interest-
ing offer); redundant prepositions (to dis-
cuss about); and the use of adjectives in-
stead of adverbs (The aim is to organize the 
services as efficient as possible). Edwards 
notes that native speakers cause confusion 
in international English-speaking environ-
ments. For example, she observes that in 
the European parliament, where simple, 
imperfect language is the default, the com-
plex, idiomatic English of the native 
speaker leads to breakdowns. Once the na-
tive speaker has left the room, business 
runs more smoothly. 
This lingua franca is remarkably effi-
cient. It will get you where you need to go, 
from point A to point B, by skimming, by 
skirting depth, avoiding multiple mean-
ings, ambiguities, and humor: a sort of 
Hovercraft English, a transportation vehi-
cle that never quite touches ground or wa-
ter. It is impoverishment that makes it ef-
fective. Impoverishment enables speakers 
to conduct quick, dirty, limited translation 
searches inside their heads, spit words out, 
and get on with the day, more or less. And 
for many situations, simple transactions 
and daily goings-on, why not?  
 
ut is this always a good idea? For 
example, the Dutch university sys-
tem, hit hard with a budgetary 
crunch, chose the solution of opening wide 
its doors to paying international students 
and changed the classroom language from 
Dutch to English. Edwards claims that, in 
her interviewing of these international stu-
dents, she learnt that their choice of Hol-
land was not just due to the affordable 
price of schooling here. They chose it also 
because the English here is easier. Perhaps 
I 
I 
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the classes are a bit like those special BBC 
news broadcasts using limited vocabulary 
and grammar for listeners who are just 
learning English. 
But at what point does English Lite com-
promise the complexity of the material 
taught? I understand faculty publishing in 
English to get a wider readership, but aban-
doning the national language at the univer-
sity level? Wouldn’t that be a step toward 
putting the Dutch language on a downward 
spiral, a slow retreat to the realms of 
kitchen and playground where only the 
simpler proficiencies are required?  
 
y day-to-day life is mostly con-
ducted in the lingua franca so 
my language diet became a 
steady regimen of bare bones rather than a 
steady leek soup. In a vague, aching sort of 
way, I became hungry. Hunger prompts 
food search. I’m on the lookout for native 
speakers and for movies. With two friends, 
one Dutch, one Turkish, I watched Three 
Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri, a 
story of hillbillies, violence, “take the law 
into your own hands,” and lunatic cop. 
Post-film, over a glass of wine, my friends 
asked, Is America really like that? I didn’t 
really care about that sort of question. 
When, in the film, one cop reprimands an-
other with, No, no. You’ve got it wrong. We 
don’t torture niggers. We torture colored 
people, what I heard was language, com-
forting language, however outrageous the 
content. There are many Englishes. I had 
just had 90 minutes with one of my Eng-
lishes: at last, a decent bowl of potage.  
Little feasts with native speakers some-
times come my way. One evening I sat 
with an American book club organizer who 
has been living here for years. The conver-
sation was rich and required no effort. I be-
came aware of my physical reactions. I had 
exhaled profoundly. My breathing had 
slowed down. I had leaned back. The meat 
on my bones had sunk heavily a couple of 
inches into my metallic bistro chair. I was 
actually perched on a rather stern cafe stool 
but, subjectively, it felt like the best padded 
armchair to come my way in weeks.  
After buzz, comedy, history, hunger, and 
food hunt came a thick layer of fatigue, 
sheer headache exhaustion at the end of 
each day—from the demands of decoding 
heavily accented speech. My new work-
place operates in Amsterdamer English, 
but all co-workers come to that common 
denominator from somewhere else. To 
each his pronunciation, from each to listen. 
Are my co-workers also in a state of 
chronic fatigue? It is patently obvious that 
they abandon Amsterdamer English when-
ever possible. From my desk, I hear duets 
in Urdu or Dutch that are started and then 
dropped as soon as lingua franca becomes 
necessary. But are the speakers needing a 
break from the fatigue of listening, or 
needing greater nuance and precision, or 
seeking relaxation and the sensation of 
“the meat on their bones sinking a couple 
of inches into their chairs?” I don’t know.  
 
t this point in my contemplations, 
the Book Fairy waved her wand. I 
actually believe in a compassion-
ate Book Fairy who will place in our paws 
exactly what we need, when we need it, to 
bring our own inarticulate musings a step 
toward clarity. 
In this specific case, the Book Fairy was 
lurking around the ABC, a book store in 
the heart of old Amsterdam, frequently 
used as a meeting point as it sits at the junc-
ture of multiple tram lines and offers an 
out-of-the-rain place to browse while wait-
ing. A small, slim, shiny book literally 
jumped from the shelf: Confabulations by 
John Berger. I thought I had already de-
voured every line Berger ever wrote but 
here was another, Berger’s latest and last, 
published about a year before his death at 
age 91. The topic was not art, Berger’s tra-
ditional focus, but language. 
Berger isn’t concerned with accents, 
brogues, and twangs. He is, however, 
mightily concerned with shades of mean-
ing. Decent translations, Berger argues, are 
not binary, from language X to language Y. 
The process is triangular. One must stay 
with the initial utterance until it seeps 
down deeply into a pre-verbal core to what 
lays beneath and, with patience, one must 
let that utterance soften, diffuse, and only 
then invite that “non-verbal something” to 
find new form in the second host language. 
This process makes its own demands and 
does not abide short cuts, time deadlines, 
or Google translate. And, make no mistake, 
says Berger, language is feminine. The ex-
pression “mother tongue” is not for naught. 
It doesn’t matter how testosterone-laden 
the content or delivery. The creature of lan-
guage itself is feminine and its center a 
phonetic uterus. In prose, and all the more 
so in poetry, the sounds come from deep 
within that uterus.  
 
Il pleure dans mon coeur, comme il pleut 
sur la ville (Paul Verlaine). 
Wie Wasser von Klippe zu Klippe geworfen 
(Friedrick Hölderlin).  
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gypre 
and gimble in the wabe (Lewis Carroll). 
Ter viel ne keer een bladtjen op het water 
(Guido Gezelle). 
 
Do the sounds—as pure sounds—have 
cultural significance? One Dutchman com-
mented on his appreciation of the harsh 
guttural sounds of Nederlands:  
 
The sounds are who we are: direct and ag-
gressive. We get annoyed with our Belgian 
neighbors and all their pussy-footing 
around. Why can’t they just say what they 
think?  
 
Does language affect who we are? An-
other Dutchman, bilingual thanks to a few 
childhood years spent in Michigan, volun-
teered: 
 
When I speak American, I’m another per-
son. 
Hmm? think I. Am I another person when I 
speak French? The answer is quite pos-
sibly yes. 
When I asked him to clarify, the Dutchman 
mundanely remarks: Well, if I’m speak-
ing American, it’s usually because I’m 
with Americans.  
Hmm? think I. So it’s not the language per 
se but the Zelig effect? 
 
One of Woody Allen’s commercially 
unsuccessful, but arguably more interest-
ing movies, Zelig, revolves around the neu-
rotic protagonist suffering from a lack of 
self and seeking the comfort of identity by 
morphing into a member of whatever 
crowd he happens to be with—for exam-
ple, sprouting beard and payot in the com-
pany of Hassidim. 
Are we all a bit Zelig? Does Zelig bring 
us back to ousted linguist B. L. Whorf, who 
argued that language influences thought? 
Now banned from proper academic circles, 
today’s worst hoax for unsuspecting un-
dergraduates in cultural anthropology is to 
give them Whorfian material on Eskimo 
words for snow and Hopi lack of past 
tense. 
M A 
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I confess to lingering sympathies with 
demoted Benjamin Lee. When we learn a 
new domain, be it snowboarding or wine, 
we learn its vocabulary and through the 
lexicon we sharpen our perceptions. For 
example, we must cultivate our awareness 
to recognize when a red wine corresponds 
to the descriptors ‘‘tannic,’’ ‘‘muscular,’’ 
or ‘‘velvety.’’ And perhaps language does 
influence thought. 
When I learnt that the Hebrew word 
mitzvah meant both joy and duty—two 
words I wouldn’t normally put together—I 
had to stop and stretch my mind. Bar mitz-
vah. Ah, I see, becoming a man is both the 
joy and the duty of the boy. Yes, I get it. 
Or the French word farouche translated in 
English as (1) wild; (2) shy; (3) fierce; (4) 
socially inept; (5) resistant; (6) untamed; 
and (7) flees when approached. 
Indeed, farouche means the bundle of all 
those translations and, now, it’s also the 
name chosen by French fashion house 
Nina Ricci for a new perfume. The thought 
farouche is completely unthinkable with-
out the word; learning the vocabulary, 
however, certainly helps. But, to get back 
to Zelig, I would contend that French (to 
take a language I know) calls forth its own 
attitude, aesthetic, and sensibilities. Speak-
ing French requires me to become French. 
It’s far subtler than, say, the maneuvering 
between the formal vous and the familiar tu 
forms. French requires a different atten-
tiveness and positioning of self in the so-
cial world. 
For me, there is another private proof of 
how language influences memory and 
thought. I know (can’t prove but know) if I 
read an English author in English or a 
French author in French, I will recall those 
works only in the original language. If I 
must translate, I struggle with equivalences 
and must follow Berger’s triangular “let-it-
sit-and-soften” method. If, however, I read 
a translation of, say, War and Peace (since 
I can’t read Russian), I don’t remember if 
the translation was English or French, 
won’t care which language is used to dis-
cuss Tolstoy and his work, and my recall 
lacks hooks, depth, color, and incisiveness. 
It smacks of Hoovercraft transportation.  
 
hat can we say of the Dutch lan-
guage itself? I don’t know yet. 
That’s an onion layer still to 
come. I’ve got a running argument with a 
colleague:  
 
My stance: I’m here, therefore, I learn 
Dutch. Simple as that. 
His stance: Bah, a waste of time to learn 
Dutch. A peasant patois. They don’t even 
have a literature.  
A Dutch friend concurs with my colleague: 
We don’t nurture our own language. We 
are a nation of engineers and traders and 
visual artists but not writers. We just bor-
row language, mostly from the British.  
 
And borrow they do. So, it’s not just that 
the Dutch are excellent at teaching foreign 
languages in their schools; it’s not just that 
they take the small-nation practical path of 
adapting to the world language of English; 
it’s that they undermine their own tongue 
through heavy infiltration and, for the most 
part, they don’t care. Dutch seems to be 
nothing but a local sauce linking English 
nouns and expressions. For example, ear-
lier this morning I’m in a waiting room and 
pick up a woman’s magazine and an old 
newspaper, just idly leafing through the 
headlines. 
 
From the newspaper Metro, April 11, 
2018: page 1. Bye Bye Facebook. Dit is 
het begin van aftakeling [the beginning 
of the decline] social media.  
From the woman’s magazine JAN, August 
2017: page 49. Wanneer ontdekte je de 
liefde? [When did you discover love?] 
Love is a battlefield.  
And turning back a page I find this whop-
per:  Ik zag in Lev geen [I saw in Lev no] 
husband material. Hij was een [he was 
a] boyfriend. Dat is dus [That is] how 
fucked up you get als je le veel [when 
you too much] “Sex and the City” hebt 
gekeken [have seen].  
 
These are not informal email exchanges 
but formal publications, newspapers and 
magazines, so I wonder if Dutch will even 
survive. In spoken Dutch, it is much the 
same. When sitting in on Dutch meetings, 
held in Dutch, for Dutch attendees, the ex-
perience will be something like hearing 
bleep bleep bleep double bind bleep bleep 
bleep bleep stress bleep bleep deadline 
bleep bleep self-fulfilling prophesy bleep.  
 
oes it matter? Somehow, yes, I 
think it does. Up until this immi-
grant experience in The Nether-
lands, I had never paid much attention to 
the Académie Française (created in 1635 
by Richelieu to curate the French lan-
guage). The Académie decides on official 
spellings and hounds the population into 
saying ‘fin de semaine’ and not ‘le week-
end.’ The Académie promotes French liter-
ature and bestows prestige upon authors. 
Maybe the Académie has a point. To sur-
vive and prosper, a language needs proto-
cols, grammar, cultivation, recognition, 
and promotion of that language’s litera-
ture. 
Consider the case of poor Algeria, which 
is almost a-lingual. Algerian is an unwrit-
ten dialect of Arabic. Classical Arabic is 
written but not spoken, and most of the TV 
programs for the larger Maghreb region are 
produced by Egypt in the Egyptian dialect. 
French instruction went by the wayside 
with winning the war for independence, 
and English is pop culture and movies. 
I remember giving a few guest lectures 
at the University of Algiers. As class be-
gins, the instructor must indicate whether 
the course will be in Algerian, French, or 
English. This is no cause for celebration. 
This is no indication that students and fac-
ulty are competently trilingual. In fact, few 
individuals can speak anything well. Cer-
tainly not well enough for university work. 
And it doesn’t really matter which of the 
three is announced as the language of 
choice; once in the room, everyone mucks 
about clumsily in all three trying to get the 
course content across. Not good. 
Still, I abide by my stance to learn 
Dutch. Integration means you learn the lan-
guage. As an immigrant, the new language, 
in whatever shape it is in, will speak vol-
umes of the new land to me. To my point, 
I just learned that, in Dutch, the word for 
guilt and the word for in debt are the same. 
Tells us something about cultural values in 
a nation of commerce, doesn’t it? 
 
hat do I miss from my “Old 
Country” of New Mexico? I 
knew I would miss the abstract 
aloofness of the improbable New Mexican 
landscape—the mesas, old volcanoes, red 
rock canyons, the saturated, intense blue 
canopy, the autumn smell of roasted green 
chilies. I knew I would miss that. I didn’t 
know how much I would miss the songs.  
In Santa Fe, Taos, and up and down the 
Rio Grande watershed, there remains a 
homegrown culture of song, not those an-
noying soggy-saccharine-cornball-com-
mercial-phoney-nasal-imitation-country & 
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western-cry-in-your-beer ditties that 
swamp the radio waves. Real songs. Songs 
coming out of the land, its people, their tri-
als and tribulations, and their self-mock-
ery. 
I miss local songwriters like Don Rich-
man and Joe West, sons of these mountains 
who grew up with high desert dust between 
their toes. To be able to feel, as they do, the 
surrounding vibes of legend, poverty, 
struggle, values, and then gather those 
vibes and pack them into a song—that’s a 
tour de force.  
 
‘07 brought grasshoppers, the next year 
there was drought 
The wheat barely replaced the seed, steers 
were all shipped out 
And it was plain to see without more food 
the winter would prevail 
So B.F. and his Remington, went to hunt 
the Hermit trail  
—Ballad of B.F. Vance, Don Richmond  
 
It’s through the absence of song in my 
current immigrant life that I’ve come to ap-
preciate how much song-as-language can 
ground us. A song compresses language, 
puts poetry put to music. A good song can, 
in the Heideggerian sense, “gather” a 
place. By that I mean it can pull together, 
intertwine, condense, zip a universe into 
some tight little transportable packet. At 
the moment when the song is played, that 
packet comes unzipped and all those ingre-
dients come spilling back out. Magic.  
 
I got an old guitar 
It won’t ever stay in tune 
I like the way it sounds 
In a dark and empty room  
 
Stuff that works, stuff that holds up  
The kind of stuff you don’ hang on the 
wall  
Stuff that’s real, stuff you feel  
The kind of stuff you reach for when you 
fall 
—Stuff That Works, Guy Clark 
 
The people of the Rio Grande dance to 
these songs. I miss this dancing in a strange 
sort of way. When living there, I had long 
sensed something significant but had never 
articulated it. It wasn’t that we were out 
getting healthy exercise instead of being 
couch potatoes sucking on the glass tit of 
TV. But what exactly was significant? 
I suspect the significance is that the local 
dancers embody their lives. Sounds ridicu-
lous. but with humankind’s penchant for 
denial, self-delusion, role-playing, and 
costuming, showing up as yourself and 
dancing yourself isn’t necessarily a given. 
My mind rolls back to dancing scenes and 
pauses at an image of one of the local danc-
ers, Raya Soleil. Pluck incarnate. Raya told 
me her birth name once—something 
dreadful like Gertrude Smingelschnort-
feinstuck, so she changed it. Rich in energy 
and smiles, far less so in funds, Raya raises 
a handicapped son as a single Mom. 
On Saturday nights, she combs her yel-
low hair, puts on a frilly skirt and cowboy 
boots, hits the dance floor and dances her 
head off. She just dances herself silly. She 
dances her life. And we would all go out 
and dance with her and we would dance for 
her and her son, and we would dance for 
ourselves and for our incomprehensible 
lives and for the love of all those dancers 
singled out by the Grim Reaper for early 
retirement, and each of us would dance for 
our own El Duende. None of this was dis-
cussed, but it was there. And on the shared 
dance floor was shared intimacy, perhaps 
not collective triumph, but at least a truce 
with life—for the duration of a song.  
  
hat John Berger could articulate 
and I could not was the essence 
of song. A song operates (it’s 
Berger speaking so) maternally. In a wom-
anly sort of way, each song goes its own 
direction but all to and from the same 
womb. We sing along, hum along, drive 
along, dance along, so that we can be en-
closed by the song. We can be inside the 
song-as-message. 
In turn, the song hunkers down inside the 
body it possesses, the torso of the singer, 
the feet of the dancer, the strummed guitar, 
the mind of the listener. The song’s tempo 
constructs a shelter from linear time—a 
shelter, says Berger, in which future, pre-
sent, and past can console, provoke, mock, 
and inspire. A song speaks of the past, of 
absence, of remembering and foreseeing, 
welcomes and farewells, of distance. We 
sing the song. The song sings us. 
 
Strumming my pain with his fingers,  
singing my life with his song,  
singing me softly with his song,  
killing me softly with his song.  
—"Killing Me Softly with His Song,” 
 famously sung by Roberta Flack  
 
When it is not possessing and filling the 
present, a song is unfixed in time and place 
but, even when not being sung and danced, 
it is a latent assembly point. A potential. A 
song hopes to reach listening ears in some 
future somewhere. John Berger proposes 
that a song leans forward.  
 
nd so, in my coming days as a new 
immigrant, I’ll learn Dutch. It’s 
not a melodious tongue. It would 
be more aesthetically pleasing to learn Ital-
ian. But I’m in Amsterdam, not Italy. 
Dutch is basically low German. In some 
ways, that makes it easier to learn, but I re-
ally have to watch out for the faux pas of 
using words the invaders used. It’s more 
socially acceptable to be a Yankee. I can 
find communities of real language to offset 
the poverty of the lingua franca. That’s not 
hard at all. The fatigue of listening doesn’t 
seem to diminish with practice, but there is 
always the end-of-day glass of wine. 
I’m rather interested in the politics of 
language. The closest to a governing body 
for questions of language seems to be a 
committee that publishes a ‘Green Book’ 
on spelling preferences. The Dutch traded 
their language for money in the universi-
ties, but it’s feet to the lowland fire in the 
immigration offices. Turks and Moroccans 
(and me) must pass a Dutch language exam 
to get permanent residence rights. Will the 
Zelig effect take hold? Will I feel and be 
felt to be Dutch as I gain proficiency? I’m 
thinking, yes, that will be the case. 
Perhaps more difficult will be the songs. 
I have yet to encounter anything on the mu-
sic scene that seems genuinely Dutch. 
There’s a considerable connoisseur audi-
ence for real jazz and a lot of copying of 
British and American pop music, but I ha-
ven’t found songs that come from here and 
speak of here. There are, as yet, no songs-
as-message I can crawl inside of. 
I went out dancing once. Yuk. Fake Brit 
band with people wiggling solo on the 
floor. There was nothing at stake. No El 
Duende. No dancing of life itself. It 
seemed pointless. I certainly didn’t feel the 
songs were singing me. But we never can 
tell. Maybe there is a song out there some-
where with immigrant empathies and it 
will lean forward and find me. 
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henomenology—at 
least my version of 
it—has always 
come easy. I find it 
clarifying and fun to see the 
world and everything in it via 
kinetic, environmental, and 
temporal dimensions. In this 
essay, I use these three 
themes to offer some notes 
on a phenomenology of 
speedskating, a sport I have 
enjoyed since childhood. 
There are many types of 
speedskating, including out-
door and indoor; recreational 
and competitive; and long-
track and short-track. What-
ever the mode, all speedskat-
ers use similar (but not al-
ways the same) techniques 
and equipment. Tracks differ 
as do skating attire and skill 
levels. Here, I focus mostly 
on indoor short-track speed-
skating, since this is the type 
in which I am most often in-
volved. 
Skating arose thousands of 
years ago when humans at-
tached bones to their feet to 
propel themselves on the ice. 
In the fourteenth century, the Dutch in-
vented wooden skates with iron runners. 
Today, skate blades are typically made of 
tempered carbon steel, coated with high 
quality chrome. Also popular are light-
weight aluminum or stainless-steel blades. 
Unlike hockey or figure skates, speed-
skates have narrow blades with less curve 
and no hollow or valley. These blades can 
be easily removed and adjusted according 
to the skater’s skill level. Even sharpening 
speedskate blades is unique: one uses a jig 
and diamond-sharpening stone. Blade 
lengths vary but, in comparison to those of 
figure-skating and hockey, speedskating 
blades are considerably longer and some-
times called “sleds.”  
Phenomenologically, speedskating is in-
triguing because of its peculiar manner of 
motion, multiple determinants of perfor-
mance, skating-rink variety, and the 
sport’s singular combination of grace, 
sounds, sights, and texture. Let’s start out 
with speedskating kinetics, by which I re-
fer to the sport’s motion and energy.  
 
Speedskating & kinetics 
As a mode of human locomo-
tion, speedskating is unique in 
that the skater achieves for-
ward velocity by sideward 
push-offs. This manner of 
movement is different from 
running, in which the runner 
propels himself forward by 
pushing off in the direction 
opposite the running direc-
tion. In contrast, rather than 
each leg’s pushing straight 
back, skating requires the 
skater to push off the ice with 
the edge of the skate blade in 
a diagonal motion. Explains 
Franco Normani, host of the 
website “Real-World Physics 
Problems”: 
 
If a skater tried to run on an 
ice surface by trying to push 
off the ice in a direction par-
allel to the skate blade, he 
couldn't do it because there is 
almost no friction between the 
ice and the blade. He would 
just slip and go nowhere. 
 
The skater must push off 
the ice with a force that is per-
pendicular to the edge of the skate blade, 
which is positioned horizontally (angling 
outward and forward) on the ice. Most of 
the skater’s movements are performed on 
these edges. One realizes the truth of the 
adage that “speedskating is for people who 
live on the edge.” 
In competitive speedskating, one usually 
skates in a counter-clockwise direction. To 
turn, one executes a kind of sideward, 
cross-over push-off. Skaters utilize the 
skates’ left-outside and right-inside edge 
on turns—what are termed “crossovers”—
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and then use both skate edges on straighta-
ways, mostly using the blade’s flat part. 
Drawing on the kinetic power of rhythm, 
speedskaters swing their arms forward and 
to the side, in contrast to the forward-and-
back arm movements of sprinters. In run-
ning, the motion of the arms keeps the ath-
lete's body from twisting on a vertical axis 
with the result that sprinters always face 
forward. In contrast, speedskaters’ side-
ways push means that the arm motions 
must be partially side to side because the 
arms keep the body from twisting. Some-
times, to rest, skaters put one or both arms 
behind their back.  
 Ideally each skating stroke, when the 
skater is going straight, begins with a 
weight shift to the outside edge of the 
skate, a move to the flat bottom, a push out 
with the inside edge, and then a repetition 
of this same pattern via the other skate. The 
movement of arms and legs pushing out 
and shifting weight can be imaged as a cir-
cle and manner of dance. And, as with all 
dances, there is plenty of room for varia-
tion, individuality, speed, and style. 
Because speedskater skates are consider-
ably longer than hockey or figure skates, 
speedskaters must push to the side or they 
will tumble forward and find themselves 
impaled. This “pushing” comes naturally 
as a primitive gesture and as an impulse of 
self-preservation. 
Gravity-wise, skaters get as “low as pos-
sible,” taking on a squatting position with 
toes, knees, shoulders, elbows, and nose in 
a straight line and stomach tucked in. This 
awkward position takes much practice to 
perfect. This squatting not only reduces 
drag caused by air resistance but also al-
lows the skater’s legs to push out farther 
with each stroke, generating more re-
sistance and thus greater momentum. 
One experiences the speed and motion as 
awesome; there is a feeling of wonder—of 
floating, gliding, and sense of bodily one-
ness with ice and earth. Every muscle in 
the skater’s body comes into play—toes, 
feet, ankles, calves, knees, thighs, hips, 
back, stomach, shoulders, arms, elbows, 
neck, head, and eyes all take part. The ice 
is hard and cold. No one wants to fall. The 
aim is a oneness in balance and movement. 
Better, easier, and much more exhilarating 
than walking, running, or driving! 
Speedskating and environment 
In turning to environmental aspects of 
speedskating, we start with ground as ice: 
hard, frozen water molecules. Speedskat-
ing sites include rivers, lakes, canals—
practically anywhere that water freezes. 
Broadly, the harder and colder the ice, the 
faster you can go (and the more important 
it is that your skate edges be sharp to cut 
into the ice to negotiate successful turns). 
Next, there are long tracks versus short 
tracks, the differences of which relate to 
lengths of racing ovals and distances of 
races. Long-track racing, if staged on an in-
side rink rather than on outside venues like 
rivers or lakes, typically involves two skat-
ers racing against the clock. Long-track 
skaters often use “hinged” skates that al-
low the heel to “hinge” up and away from 
the skate’s insole. This flexibility allows 
the foot a good amount of freedom from 
the skate proper, and the skater can in-
crease speed. 
In contrast, short-track racing involves 
six or more skaters all racing against each 
other. Short-track racing requires much 
more turning and adept use of skate edges. 
This format regularly produces bodily con-
tact that makes short-track events some-
times seem a “demolition derby.” In fact, 
short-track skaters sometimes wear shirts 
reading, “You only live once.” Typically, 
short-track skating takes place on rinks 
shared with hockey- and figure-skaters. 
The walls of these rinks are lined with 
dasher boards—heavy pads that cushion 
skaters who lose control. 
Coaches tell skaters that they must in-
crease speed, since the faster that skaters 
move, the more they are able to lean to pro-
duce more centrifugal force around turns, 
thereby allowing skates to stay in line. In 
other words, parallel blades generate more 
resistance and therefore more speed as the 
skater moves centrifugally against the 
force. The caveat here is that as skaters go 
faster, the harder they slam the wall if a 
skate slips out. For this reason, essential 
equipment includes helmets, knee pads, 
neck pads, and no cut suits. 
One of the best parts of speedskating is 
the gratification of having conquered grav-
itational and centrifugal forces. It is an ex-
traordinary feeling, even more remarkable 
on a hot summer day as one enters a world 
of ice. Also pleasurable is speedskating’s 
solitary quality: meditative, invigorating, 
restorative, and entirely different from the 
sing-song, seductive quality that accompa-
nies figure skating or the violent, “hard-
rock” ambience associated with hockey. 
This is the speedskater’s environment: 
the beauty, coolness, and quiet of ice with 
skate blades riding on the hard surface and 
cutting through that surface on turns. 
 
Speedskating and time 
How long does one skate? It depends. 
Races are usually 500, 1,000, 1,500, or 
3,000 meters; and 3,000- or 5,000-meter 
relays. One’s track time depends on how 
intensely and forcefully he or she contends 
with ancient, natural forces. Broadly, skat-
ers skate as long as they want to, according 
to their physical, mental, and spiritual 
goals. They skate as long and as hard as 
they desire, depending on what they are 
training for and the particular type of train-
ing for which they aim. Skating is fun, 
cool, challenging, and great for enhancing 
muscle strength and balance. Skating 
clears the mind, body, and soul. 
Yes, one gets tired. Muscles and lungs 
may burn from exertion. There may be 
pain and discomfort. But speedskating is 
invigorating. The skater become one with 
the ice and, if outside, with the beauty of 
the natural environment in which he or she 
is immersed. 
It is difficult to describe skating’s circu-
lar motion of time, which may relate to the 
length of a lap on a skating oval, or the re-
petitive rhythm of the seasons, or the way 
that water molecules freeze, harden, be-
come ice, melt and becomes water again. 
Or even the cycle of life and death. 
 
An intoxicating synergy 
However one describes speedskating, it in-
corporates kinetics, environment, and time 
in an intoxicating synergy of motion, bal-
ance, ice, and speed. One feels a sense of 
accomplishment as he or she confronts and 
conquers basic forces of nature and sur-
vives to skate another day. 
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he influential Victorian art critic, 
cultural theorist, and draughts-
man John Ruskin is a vital influ-
ence on my research and creative 
practice. Ruskin’s writings have experi-
enced a resurge of interest from contempo-
rary critical and philosophical perspec-
tives, enabling me to contribute to and ben-
efit from a wider discussion reinterpreting 
Ruskin’s relevance today [1]. 
In my doctoral thesis, Drawing on Na-
ture—the Legacy of Ruskin’s Moral Cos-
mos, I set out to retrace Ruskin’s thinking 
on how drawing can act as a foundation for 
understanding the natural environment [2]. 
Ruskin did not divide the natural from the 
human-made, as his interest in the environ-
ment stretched seamlessly across the natu-
ral ‘vegetable’ states of being to cultural 
artifice. As design theoretician Lars 
Spuybroek explains:  
 
To John Ruskin, all things are plants, be 
they houses, carpets, city halls, church 
spires, paintings, countries or anything 
else—everything is immobile and flourish-
ing at once [3].  
 
In this essay, I discuss my methods of 
practice, which are concerned with draw-
ing and my environmental experiences. 
Ruskin’s work is central to my research 
and informs my thinking and ways of see-
ing and creating. Ruskin’s writings rein-
force a reciprocal relationship between the-
ory and practice, mediating and scrutiniz-
ing a problematic binary understanding of 
culture and nature. He firmly believed in 
the value of drawing as a form of visual en-
gagement that transcends mere looking. 
When reading Raymond Fitch’s biog-
raphy of Ruskin, one realizes that Ruskin’s 
engagement with natural and human-made 
environments was far from static [4]. I con-
sider his love for gothic architecture and 
his preference for Italian pre-Renaissance 
painting as attempts to re-invigorate the 
present and future. He reminds us of the 
greater cohesion of arts unified in a large 
concerted social effort subordinated to a 
spiritual ideal that transcends individual-
ism. 
Ruskin’s Elements of Drawing was first 
published 1857 [5]. It soon became a 
standard textbook for art students and am-
ateurs; it is still used today as a primer con-
necting drawing philosophy with hands-on 
exercises. Ruskin’s teaching of laborers at 
night school was indicative of his social 
commitment and attested to his wish to re-
form society, also evident in his unfinished 
project of establishing an alternative edu-
cation system through the Guild of St 
George. Drawing was therefore instrumen-
tal in his plans for social reform in accord-
ance with spiritual ideals about appreciat-
ing the natural world and searching out its 
originary order [6]. 
In Elements of Drawing, Ruskin advo-
cates the use of innovative technology of 
his time (the daguerrotype) to counter-
check the accuracy of one’s observational 
power [7]. Yet approaches concerned with 
surface alone would not do justice to the 
complexity of his drawing theory and prac-
tice. For Ruskin, travel was essential for 
environmental awareness. Seeing some-
thing new or unusual, he would stop to rec-
ord details that caught his eye (wild flow-
ers, trees, architectural ornament, fenestra-
tion, façades). He would traverse long dis-
tances by carriage to visit his preferred 
places of culture located within or adjacent 
to his favorite natural locations: for exam-
ple, the city architectures of Venice set in 
the lagoon (Stones of Venice) or Swiss 
mountains, towns and villages (Modern 
Painters). He explored the vernacular as 
cultural products emplaced within their 
own geography [8]. 
Ruskin’s being on the move is an im-
portant factor to note, as it shifts the mode 
of perception from immobile, fixed posi-
tioning in control through surveillance (via 
the vista and Renaissance perspective) to 
the three-dimensionality of the enveloping 
environment as a fluid, navigational expe-
rience, capturing the attention and imagi-
nation of the traveler who becomes its sub-
ject. 
The importance of walking, of being on 
the move, and on how this makes us per-
ceive our environment, and in turn how it 
perceives us is a subject that philosopher 
Edward Casey examines through a phe-
nomenological approach to walking from 
space to place. Walking connects us with 
our environment in an intimate network re-
lationship [9]. The activity of engagement 
as living experience is best captured for 
Casey via the German term Erlebnis, pref-
erable to the passivity of memory, the al-
ready-elapsed experience (Erfahrung), a 
vantage point that effectively distances us 
from being part of the ecology of relation-
ships in place: 
 
Walking is relational: my body connects 
with path, grass, sand. The world passes 
T 
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me at my own pace, is animated, flowing 
through me, below and above me, project-
ing infinite possibilities of three-dimen-
sional orientation. Walking is a form of 
drawing with the body in space: performa-
tive drawing. This encounter with infinite 
spaces  becomes more than perception; it 
transforms into lived experience [10]. 
 
In a related way, anthropologist Tim In-
gold presents an understanding of sight 
that sits comfortably with Ruskin’s. Ingold 
deconstructs the assumption that sight di-
minishes the other senses [11]. He rein-
states sight as an agent for multi-sensory 
awareness no longer maligned as the ‘vil-
lain’, of the panoptical ocular-centric gaze 
of modernism [12]. Through careful re-ex-
amination of Descartes, James Gibson and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (among others), 
Ingold draws on anthropological infor-
mation from native and aboriginal cultures 
to reinterpret sight as a perception that does 
not operate separately from the other 
senses. Enriched by sound, touch, and 
physical awareness, sight is no longer pre-
sented as a disembodied agent. We hear 
with our eyes and see with our ears: 
 
[I]t is not vision that objectifies the world, 
but rather the harnessing of vision to a 
project of objectification that has reduced 
it to an instrument of disinterested obser-
vation... [13]. 
 
Ingold’s suggestion here that movement 
and sight do not operate in isolation from 
other senses is an important factor in my 
own approach to drawing [14]. Further-
more, Ingold’s argument validates Rus-
kin’s emphasis on proper looking—in 
other words, that drawing helps us to see 
more clearly [15]. In addition, a reciprocal 
approach and understanding of the process 
of drawing helps me to understand the re-
lationship between perceived self and oth-
ers, inanimate or animate, inter-subjective 
or inter-objective, leading on to Ruskin’s 
concept of sympathy, which lies at the 
heart of my drawing method.  
 
Walking-Drawing 
 Of longstanding interest to me is the walk-
ing-drawing that formed part of the self-
education of artisan, craftsman, builder, 
and architect for centuries, evident in the 
notebooks of Scottish Arts and Crafts ar-
chitect Charles Rennie Mackintosh [16]. 
Mackintosh walked through many British 
landscapes, acquainting himself with a 
deeper understanding of vernacular archi-
tecture in place. He believed it insufficient 
to study historical architectural styles from 
photographs, plans, elevations, and blue-
prints. Mackintosh asserted that under-
standing vernacular building had to be the 
result of a holistic experience of encounter-
ing a building in its setting. 
This approach is highly relevant to my 
own sketchbook practice. I recently relo-
cated to the rural area of England’s North 
Yorkshire, where I find myself constantly 
examining the use of vernacular stone and 
the situation of dwellings in the landscape, 
being emplaced by the distinct geology and 
geography of the region, formed through 
the practices of traditional hill farming and 
connected through a network of historical-
cultural footpaths establishing public right 
of way and communication lines among 
habitations. These public footpaths cut 
through possessive relationships of land 
and continue to enable access to privately 
owned properties. These days more a lei-
sure pursuit than providing walkways for 
necessity, the shifting usage of these trails 
indicates that living in and with the land is 
undergoing constant transformation, espe-
cially in terms of uses valuable for human 
society. Even so, the century-old rights of 
way provide continuity and connect us 
physically with history. 
Unlike Mackintosh, I do not aim for 
translation into innovative building or any 
form of architecture. In this sense, my 
practice lacks that sense of destination and 
synthesis, or so I thought until recently 
when I wrote this essay, which allowed me 
to consider further my drawing methods—
a welcome point of revision after complet-
ing a doctoral program. Even a practice-
based PhD study is somewhat artificial in 
the way it ties one’s imagination and crea-
tivity to a research question, thereby invit-
ing a sense of hierarchy and subservience 
of practice to theory that is hard to resist. 
Some two years following completion, I 
am still in recovery, finding myself recon-
necting my love for landscape as natural-
cultural phenomenon with my preference 
for sketching—the practice of understated 
notebook-keeping not intending finish or 
publication at the point of making. 
There remain continuities with my com-
pleted PhD, in particular through German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger and English 
travel and nature writer Robert Macfarlane 
and his musings on the value of ancient 
routes of walking. I am uneasy about a 
sense of lingering escapism, when indulg-
ing in experiences of walks across fells, at 
sunset and moonrise, watching bats chas-
ing bait, or listening to mountain sheep’s 
disembodied muffled sounds in the enclos-
ing night. This unease no doubt connects 
with what Heidegger refers to as anxiety, 
an inverted form of caring:  
 
Heidegger leaves open the possibility of 
temporary connectedness with nature as a 
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spiritual encounter—and this is described 
as authentic, as the rare moments when a 
human being can overcome alienation and 
separateness from being part of nature 
through caring for the environment. Care 
and the state of anxiety are the two remain-
ing possibilities to overcome alienation 
from environment and to allow for momen-
tary authentic existence [17].  
 
Expanded sight 
Walking as a practice of perception inter-
acts with multi-sensory awareness, though 
there is a question about stationary activi-
ties of drawing and how they might work 
to heighten sense experience—in short, 
standing still so the surrounding world 
might inform me through its presentness 
and continuous flux. Is it that the world 
around me, which continues to inform me 
and is not isolated from myself, is taking 
over the motion, and I, the center in a world 
of flux, assimilate? 
Walks in nature, appreciation of envi-
ronment through slow motion, engagement 
on a pace of one’s own, contact with feet 
to ground, and sense of balance, all other 
senses finely tuned to listening in on ambi-
ent sound anticipating the unexpected, re-
connect with the wild in me that is appre-
hensive and highly attuned to unusual 
sounds. Walking is a pace different from 
cycling or going by train or car, different 
speeds, divided attention. The walking ex-
perience of the environment differs from 
the observation of detail, in some sense a 
partitioning or severing apart from the 
wider environment, as a temporary act, a 
zooming in, a partial focus perhaps, allow-
ing fullest attention of a differentiation.   
Such walks do not seek out problems of 
which there are so many in our ecologi-
cally precarious times. Rather, in these 
walks, I take comfort from landscapes that 
remain intact, congruent, preserving a 
more traditional way of life of farming and 
interaction of humans with animals and 
plants, agriculture and ecology, of history 
embedded in landscape. These landscapes 
are inspiring and uplifting because they 
present continuity. 
The Yorkshire Dales, (like other exten-
sively farmed and remote landscapes in the 
West of Cumbria in England, the North of 
Scotland, or North Wales), have a particu-
lar pull and magnetic hold on people. The 
hill farmers know this through their ani-
mals, as Yorkshire and Cumbrian hill 
farmers rely on their sheep’s knowledge of 
place. The unbordered, open-moorland 
grazing of mountain sheep like Herdwicks 
or Swaledale breed requires these animals 
to be ‘hefted’ to the land. These sheep have 
interior compasses guiding them back to 
their place of origin and belonging. 
I am mindful that any type of farming is 
problematic as it puts the power into hu-
man hands, whereas hunter-gather socie-
ties have a fairer relationship of sharing 
land and natural resources, something I am 
only too often reminded of in my daily 
walks past the auction mart of the village 
where I now live. Yet I admire how the re-
lationship of farmer to animal and earth in-
forms the way the land is shaped and pro-
duces a particular type of North Yorkshire 
vernacular architecture incorporating local 
stone to make what looks to me like large 
drawings or utilitarian earthworks with 
dry-stone walls, barns, and sheepfolds that 
dissect and structure the landscape. 
But a sense of guilt arises from my de-
liberately shunning to draw attention to 
how precarious and threatened such seem-
ing equilibrium is. This landscape is heal-
ing for me, but what can I do to return the 
favor? Besides participating in environ-
mental activism or supporting charity, my 
drawing the land could be considered a gift 
in return, a spiritual activity to celebrate 
and ask for forgiveness. 
Ruskin also offers some answers. Never 
did any form of social ills or pollution stop 
him from practicing the art of drawing and 
celebrating beautiful forms and sympa-
thetic relationships. Such drawing (for ex-
ample Moss and Wild Strawberry) pro-
vides a model for how relationships should 
be: ecologically balanced, a social model; 
a symbiotic relationship that ensures wild-
ness in sympathy [18]. 
 
Sympathy through drawing 
 
Now in all this observe how the higher con-
dition of art… depends upon largeness of 
sympathy. It is mainly because the one 
painter has communion of heart with his 
subject, and the other only casts his eye 
upon it feeling-lessly that the work of one 
is greater than that of the other [19].  
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Drawing in sympathy can be described as 
an act of deep immersion that helps me to 
become aware of relations in my environ-
ment; close looking is part of this experi-
ence. In the passage just quoted from Mod-
ern Painters, Ruskin asserts that drawing 
transcends observation; drawing is about 
deepening the dialogue with the envi-
ronment and is “communion of heart.” 
In the rest of this essay, I examine how 
I practice Ruskin’s method of drawing 
with sympathy.  
My practice shows certain character-
istics when engaging with the environ-
ment. I rarely invent from my head (alt-
hough I believe that any improvisation 
or invention is based on memorized ob-
servations, consciously so, or uncon-
sciously stored and filtered). Sense data 
need to be entered onto paper. These 
cannot not be solely about sight, as they 
are about a wider sense of experience, 
sub-consciously or consciously incor-
porating sound, humidity, the light of 
the day waxing or waning. When work-
ing in the field, I find that my drawings 
tend to be more fluid and become paint-
erly; drawing while walking, slowing 
down, stopping, surrendering to the ge-
ography of a place, making myself fit 
into the environment. At times I use photo-
graphs deliberately out of focus to capture 
the mood of uncertainty. I value the awak-
ening and equilibrium of all senses in twi-
light. 
Frequently however, I wish to draw a de-
tail, an aim that initially requires an isola-
tion of an object and a form of temporary 
‘objectification’ through partitioning off 
an aspect of a larger organic system. This 
effort presents a challenge for sympathetic 
engagement. Botanical studies offer a pos-
sibility to allow the chosen object for draw-
ing to remain situated in place, a difficult 
drawing experience practically because the 
terrain often obstructs full access to a cho-
sen detail.  
There is a poetry and sadness of loss that 
provides a counterpoint in my practice. 
This sadness mourns the cultures of pos-
session, the subjection of others to systems 
of classification, often arbitrary out of 
hindsight. These divorced objects are ele-
gies—being out of place, they fulfil a dif-
ferent metonymical function, making Rus-
kin’s approach to drawing relevant in a dif-
ferent way. In Modern Painters, Ruskin re-
fers to the painting Slave Ship by J. W. M. 
Turner to exemplify art that provides ca-
tharsis [20]. In this painting, the sympathy 
extends to the suffering of the slaves, also 
out of place, and condemned to death by 
their captors (the practice of throwing 
slaves overboard to claim insurance money 
was apparently widespread during the pe-
riod of slave trade.) 
Artworks like Turner’s Slave Ship are 
much more than a news item or, in our day, 
a media image. Rather, the artistic aim is to 
draw the bystander in and help to internal-
ize the event, to draw conclusions about 
one’s own morality and that of the wider 
world. Can paintings or drawings motivate 
change? No matter how temporary, can a 
change of heart provoke a feeling of attri-
tion—a softening, perhaps, leading on to 
some more permanent change or even ac-
tion to remedy?  
 
Drawing Hippopotamus & Pangolin 
Recently, I discovered that the natural his-
tory collection of Liverpool’s Victoria 
Gallery and Museum houses a collection of 
taxidermy, displaced from their environ-
ment and divorced from their original hab-
itat. These animal-objects ‘looked’ back at 
me, returned my gaze through their seem-
ingly lifeless presence. Among those that 
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stood out most ‘loudly’ were two pre-
served pangolins and the embryo of a hip-
popotamus. 
As I drew the preserved animals, now 
displayed to make visitors aware of endan-
gered species, I pondered the contradictory 
attitude of human species to their fellow 
creatures. In the name of science, these an-
imals were ‘privileged’ to death and 
preservation, displayed to raise our guilty 
conscience about their survival. These ob-
jects had a pulling power, in their helpless 
state, aborted prematurely from life, one 
literally not even born, the others not 
reaching their natural destination, both 
types standing in metonymically for a 
much larger persecution of a species se-
lected as desirable for alternative medi-
cine.   
For several weeks, I sat drawing these 
creatures with sympathy. On one occasion, 
I was joined by Tamzin Ashcroft, one of 
my undergraduate students from Liverpool 
Hope University. I believe that this process 
to connect emotionally with these animals 
helps to restore lost life by my trying to un-
derstand their structure, organization, pos-
ture, and texture through drawing. My 
sense of self became diminished, my state 
of mind calmed, yet my senses were more 
alert. Through drawing, I forced myself to 
confront what I had suppressed or failed to 
notice. I would suggest that a first stage of 
reinstating a respectful relationship to 
these exhibited creatures was facilitated 
through the effort to understand the com-
plexity of their own presence and being.  
For example, the pangolin beckons in its 
state of displacement. In my imagination, 
it asks to be reunited—a ghost-haunting 
collective consciousness. The act of sym-
pathy creates a temporary bond that asks 
for remorse, forgiveness, and restorative 
action for the future. This process may re-
late to the role of shaman in aboriginal so-
cieties [21]. Or one thinks of the eco-
logically motivated practices of artist 
Josef Beuys, whose performances 
sometimes involved living and dead 
(taxidermy) animals. Such approaches 
relate to Ingold’s understanding of the 
‘animic world’ as ‘dialogical’:  
 
The animals [killed for food] offer 
something of their potentiality and sub-
stance to human beings so that the lat-
ter may live, while humans, in return, 
through the proper treatment of the an-
imals in death, ensure the release of 
their life force and hence their subse-
quent reincarnation. Human life, which 
in the totemic ontology is predicated 
upon the immortality of the land, is 
here predicated upon the mortality of 
animals. In the animic ontology, the 
killing and eating of game is far more 
than mere provisioning; it is world-re-
newing [22].  
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Stages in the drawing process 
When studying details of the dead animals, 
I find that there are two stages in the draw-
ing process: first, an emotional immersion 
and attraction, paying reverential attention; 
and second, re-production and re-inven-
tion. The latter more often is the result of 
my removal or distancing from the subject 
of study, a situation that is inevitable when 
I work from memory or draw making use 
of others’ representations (e.g., photo-
graphs) because the self reclaims attention 
and the first-hand presence of the thing be-
ing represented (e.g., animal, plant, or 
landscape) is diminished. 
I also recognize that my drawing prac-
tice relates to the degree to which my sub-
ject is a part of or apart from its original 
context and place. In this regard, I identify 
two additional aspects of the drawing pro-
cess that can be described as follows.  
 
1.  When I draw a detail, I first separate an 
aspect of my subject from its context, 
thereby treating it as separate from itself, 
and creating a new (somewhat enforced) 
relationship with me, the artist. This sub-
ject-as-object becomes the focus of atten-
tion and often seems to evoke a quality of 
reciprocity—in other words, the Other 
looks back at me, catches my eye, some-
how akin to a silent dialogue. This process 
requires full sensory engagement. 
The act of seeing an individual entity, es-
pecially if within its natural habitat, is one 
of temporary severing, but the analysis 
leads back to synthesis. A connection is 
made between me and the selected aspect. 
I work to overcome the divide of self from 
nature through the act of drawing. The ac-
tual translation into line then forms part of 
a reparative action. Through my senses, I 
am infused by the Other, to the extent that 
self becomes oblivious. The Other capti-
vates me. 
Through trying to understand the 
Other’s structure and special qualities of 
color, shape, organization, I overcome dif-
ference and hierarchies, which are broken 
down. Who has chosen whom begs the 
question. Has the object summoned me, or 
have I chosen it? The act of severing the 
part from the whole through focus of atten-
tion becomes a metaphorical act, as the 
severed part then stands in for the whole. 
This process is as applicable to cultural ar-
tifacts as to things of nature.  
Deep immersion in details ensures a 
bond between me as artist and the chosen 
aspect of animal, plant, mountain, or build-
ing. This relationship need not be harmo-
nious: suffering, loss, or sadness can also 
summon creative attention in powerful 
ways, thereby ensuring a temporary over-
coming of the division between self and 
what that self perceives as Other. Sympa-
thy fosters a common thread 
that may involve compassion 
or an awareness of what one 
shares with the Other, no mat-
ter what that Other is. 
  
 2. A second drawing phrase 
unfolds in my studio and in-
corporates a different kind of 
bringing together in which I 
gather sense impressions and 
articulate my understanding 
of otherness through the im-
mersive practice of drawing, 
with the desire for bringing 
together what I have learned, 
freely reciting, no longer obli-
gated to observation but nev-
ertheless subordinating the 
parts to new patterns and new 
purposes. 
The fantastical is borne and 
the imagination leaps. In 
some ways, this phase is ‘fiction’ and ‘vis-
ual story telling’. With the act of assem-
bling from the material gathered through 
observation, something else is inserted: my 
will, my dreams, my fears. There is com-
position and deliberation; the parts that 
strike me have now become subject of my 
will to become subordinated to a larger 
idea. There arises a synthesis and outcome, 
frequently expressed through exhibition or 
installation. 
One example is my focus on the suffer-
ing of animals: for my PhD show, I created 
several drawings that depicted narratives 
of ecological disasters. I presented these 
drawings on scrolls of lining paper stretch-
ing over several meters. One, entitled Ma-
rine Scroll 2, depicts the journey and plight 
of the herring, the transmigration of a shoal 
of fish into explosive energy ending in the 
absurdity of a doll contemplating melan-
cholia. In another, entitled Marine Scroll 1, 
Jetsam, I placed plant and animal parts I 
had found alongside fragments of human 
detritus that included plastic, metal, and 
glass [23].  
A second example is illustrated in draw-
ings [see next page, top] through which I 
paid homage to ecologist Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (1962). These drawings’ im-
plied message played a key role in how I 
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reassembled the parts. These composi-
tional considerations are important for di-
recting the viewer to ‘get’ the message and 
illustrate an ideological dimension of my 
work.   
A third example is a recent synthesis that 
borrows from my earlier Pangolin draw-
ings, including my sketchbook images but 
supplemented by photographic references 
for color and posture. I created a somewhat 
fanciful creation more reminiscent of a me-
dieval invention—a heraldic emblem in-
corporating a washed-out, ghostly pres-
ence suggested by the original taxidermy.  
This approach to reinventing the animal 
fictionally provokes uncertainty. When I 
begin, I don’t know what I will ultimately 
draw. Parameters for correctness are lifted, 
and I am allowed to invent. There is ten-
sion about whether the new creation will be 
a miscreation, a parody, even a monster. 
And there is personal uncertainty as to 
whether my effort has failed or succeeded.   
 
Recovering a sense of vision 
I am ambivalent about this second stage of 
practice because there is a lingering 
doubt—a sense that synthesis divorced 
from the original dialogue with the Other 
‘kills’ the spirit of encounter. Are the re-
sults mere cultural trophies little different 
from the corpses objectified as collector 
items? Merleau-Ponty suggests that to 
avoid being “swallowed up… by the ob-
jects of sight” and resist objectification 
into mere things, “we need to reverse this 
perspective, to recover the sense of vision 
that is original to our experience of the 
world, and that is a precondition for its ob-
jectification” [24].   
 28 
 
I believe that Ruskin allows for this phe-
nomenological task of reversal through a 
mode of vision that is not “cold” and does 
not objectify. His drawing, Moss and Wild 
Strawberry, exemplifies a holistic, phe-
nomenally experienced environment. In 
my own practice, this synthesis rarely hap-
pens in cloistered environments like the 
studio and is more often satisfactory if pro-
duced in situ or as part of a physical or im-
agined narrative implying motion and dy-
namic development. One example is my 
drawing, above, of daisies in light wind en-
veloped by summer shadows. 
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Advanced Research Press, 1997), pp. 13–52.  
10. Rohr, p. 62 [see note 2]. This quotation is from 
my notebooks, which I tend to take with me almost 
everywhere and at any time, to draw and write, en-
meshing the two modes of recording frequently. 
11. T. Ingold The Perception of the Environment 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 
12. M. Jay, Downcast Eyes (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of 
California Press, 1995). 
13. “In defense of Descartes, it is important to recog-
nize two aspects of this account which are often over-
looked. First, it was plain to him that perception—
whether visual or tactile—depended on movement. 
Were there no movement of the body and its sensory 
organs relative to the environment, nothing would be 
perceived. Ironically, this point has been lost in much 
of the subsequent psychology of vision, only to be re-
discovered by advocates of an ecological approach to 
visual perception who adopt an explicitly anti-Carte-
sian stance”; quoted from Ingold, p. 254 [see note 11]. 
14. Ibid., p. 273. 
15. “[T]he chief aim and bent of the following system 
is to obtain, first, a perfectly patient, and, to the ut-
most of the pupil‘s power, a delicate method of work, 
such as may ensure his seeing truly. For I am nearly 
convinced that, when once we see keenly enough, 
there is very little difficulty in drawing what we see; 
but, even supposing that this difficulty be still great, I 
believe that the sight is a more important thing than 
the drawing; and I would rather teach drawing that my 
pupils may learn to love Nature, than teach the look-
ing at Nature that they may learn to draw”;  quoted 
from John Ruskin in his introduction to the Elements 
of Drawing, p. 13 [see note 5]. 
16. Mackintosh’s 1920 drawing of the Dorset village 
of Worth Matravers is available at: http://collec-
tions.gla.ac.uk/ - details=ecatalogue.53110. 
17. Rohr, p. 165 [see note 2]. Examining a sense of 
‘environmental unease’ in relation to Heidegger and 
Ruskin is a central part of my dissertation. I estab-
lished a common ground through the method of draw-
ing as an awareness-raising tool. I argued that efforts 
at critical seeing contribute to self-knowledge. I asso-
ciated a lack of authenticity with a nagging sense of 
self-doubt and anxiety. 
18. J. Ruskin, Moss and Wild Strawberry, (prob. June 
1873), graphite and traces of bodycolor on grey-blue 
paper, mount 54.1 x 37.6 cm., (WA.RS. REF.090) 
Ashmolean Museum, Univ. of Oxford 
(http://ruskin.ashmolean.org/collection/8979/object/
14351%20-). 
19. J. Ruskin, Modern Painters IV, in Works VI, p. 19 
[see note 5]. 
20. J. Ruskin, Modern Painters I, Works III, pp. 571–
72 [see note 5]. Ruskin praises Turner’s Slave Ship as 
the highest category of truth. 
21. Ingold, p 281 [see note 11]. 
22. Ibid., p. 114 [see note 11]. 
23. See Appendices in Rohr [see note 2]. 
24. Merleau-Ponty as quoted in Ingold, p 265 [see 
note 11] and drawn from M. Merleau-Ponty, The Pri-
macy of Perception, J. M. Edie, ed. (Evanston, IL., 
Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p 178. 
 
Images in text 
p. 22: Doris Rohr 2018 Notebook walking/ train rid-
ing notebook page, mixed media on paper. 
p. 23: Doris Rohr 2018 Ink drawing during twilight 
in situ of landscape arrested moment during walk ink 
on paper. 
p. 24: Doris Rohr 2018 Ink drawing from walk—ar-
rested moment: dusk, darkness closing in Ink on pa-
per. 
p. 24: Doris Rohr 2017 Clover detail watercolor on 
paper. 
p. 25, upper left: Doris Rohr 2018 Notebook - Hippo 
embryo pencil on paper. 
p. 25, upper right: Doris Rohr 2018 Notebook Pan-
golin pencil on paper. 
p. 25: Dead pangolin on display. 
p. 25: Doris Rohr drawing the pangolin in Victoria 
Gallery and Museum, Liverpool. 
p. 26: Tamzin Ashcroft drawing the pangolin in Vic-
toria Gallery and Museum, Liverpool. 
p. 26: Tamzin Ashcroft 2018 sketchbook page, 
closeup of eye and teeth of pangolin, pencil on paper. 
p. 27, upper: Doris Rohr 2015 Homage to Rachel 
Carson, pencil and watercolor on tracing paper; sec-
tions from folded map.  
p. 27: Doris Rohr Pangolin 2018 watercolor and ink 
on paper. 
p. 28: Doris Rohr 2017 Daisies in summer shadows 
with light wind, watercolor on paper.
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4]) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
❖ What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
❖ What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
❖ Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
❖ Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, critical theory, re-
lationalist and non-representational per-
spectives, the various conceptual 
“turns,” and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
❖ Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
❖ How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
❖ What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
❖ Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
❖ What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
❖ Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
❖ Why has the topic of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
❖ What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
❖ Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and awareness among places, especially 
places that are considerably different 
(e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or 
regions)? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
❖ How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
❖ What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
❖ What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
❖ What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
❖ Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understanding the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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